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ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of three empirical essays on labor economics: children 
immigration, informal employment and social mobility in Mexico.  
How does affect household immigration child labor? focus in a little explored area 
in Mexico, the effect of household immigration on child labor. Using the 2013 
MTI-ENOE, we set up a bivariate probit model to control two mixed effects, the 
inverse relation between child labor and education, and the endogeneity in the 
family migration. Results shows that the probability of child labor of a immigrant 
child is higher compared to a non migrant child, this probability increases with his 
age and it is larger for boy relative to girls. In relation to household composition, I 
found that rates of child labor is higher in household with father absent. In fact, 
we found that immigrant children are a vulnerable group, even if they seem to 
have a higher level of education than non-migrant, they work longer hours for a 
payment 
Intergenerational transmission of informal employment in Mexico. A limited 
choice or better income prospects? motivates the use of retrospective data 2011 
ESRU Survey of Social Mobility in Mexico. I formulate a formal/informal 
employment occupation model to estimate the likelihood for sons to continue the 
same fatherʑs employment occupation sector. Different from the previous evidence 
in Mexico, my study differs in three ways: (1) empirical strategy aims at 
controlling as much as possible for heterogeneity sample, (2) microeconometric 
framework derives from a structural model with expected wages explicitly 
determining labor occupation decisions, (3) selectivity bias is achieved using a 
two-steep estimation following (Lee, 1982) procedure. My results show a strong 
connection between intergenerational occupation, also predicted earnings 
differentials between occupation sectors. Hence, individuals with informal parentʑs 
occupation have less likelihood to be enrolled in the formal sector. 
 
 
 Leaving the nest or living with her parents: Evidence from Mexican millennia’s 
generation adds to the literature by examining the determinants of childrenʑs 
propensity to live with their parents. 2010 census enumerated that 67 percent 
young adults aged 20 to 29 years still living with their parents, 29 percent living 
with a partner and about 4 percent living alone. Why young adults co-residence 
with her parents beyond mature age has several issue. i.e., living with parentʑs 
serves as an important mechanism through with parents transfer resources to their 
adultʑs sons. 
We focus on Millenniaʑs Generation (1980–1999) in order to consider some 
relevant characteristicsʑ in this generation. I found that labor participation reduce 
the propensity to co residence only for males, this is explained in part by lower 
labor participation for female sample, however, this results should be considered 
with caution due to endogeneity between labor participation and co residence. 
Surprisingly to the results in other papers, the effect of education attained on the 
propensity to remain living with parents is absent.  
In addition, controlling by working status and schooling of parentʑs we found that 
motherʑs appears to be the most important. Similar to other papers, we found 
that children living in household where both parents are working may experience 
low unemployment rates, which is associated with independence of children at 
younger age.  
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Chapter 1 . H ow does affect household immigration 
child labor? Evidence from M exico 
How does affect household immigration child 
labor? Evidence from M exico   
1.1 Introduction 
This paper focus on a little explored area, the effect of migration on child labor, in 
other words, we would like to test whether immigrant children have a larger 
propensity to work compared with those non–migrant children.  
The International Labor Organization (ILO henceforth) mentions that 1 in 8 
persons is migrant around the world, from which a third of the migrant flow from 
developing countries are young people, aged 12 to 24 year. According to the 2011 
Mexican National Survey of Demographics Dynamics (ENADID, for its acronym 
in Spanish) 16 out of 100 people reside in a different location to its birthplace. 
Mexican Population Census statistics show a decrease in the immigration rates 
from 3.8 percent to 2.9 percent between 2000 and 2010, for children aged 5 to 17 
years, our objective sample.1 
Usually, most children migrate with their families, so then migration is a survival 
solution for households in need, because it provides them new opportunities to 
families and their children Glind (2010). Also, migration decision is influenced by 
several factors, such as a conflict and natural disasters, domestic violence, family 
structure, family income, and search for better opportunities. Hence, migration 
can provide a positive experience by providing them with a better life, increase job 
opportunities, escape from immediate threats such as forced marriage, and have 
access to school or to a better school Hashim (2005). Also, migration might 
provide an opportunity to run away social order divisions to work with dignity 
and freedom at the destination Deshingkar and Akter (2009). 
  
                                    
1 http://www.ilo.org/ipec/areas/Migration_and_CL/lang--en/index.htm 
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However, children migrants could face serious challenges in their destinations, e.g. 
Powers (2011) suggests that a change in household membership changes the 
overall household workload of both home production and market work. 
Additionally, empirical studies suggest that migration makes children increasingly 
vulnerable to child labor, usually because they enroll in the worst forms of child 
labor with low wages and long working hours, Immink and Payongayong (1999), 
Edmonds and Shrestha (2013). As Coffey (2013) points out, if parents do not 
know about this disadvantage, or they do not consider it when deciding whether 
or not to take their children with them when they migrate, then it constitutes a 
negative externality of immigration.  
This paper examines the empirical evidence linking migration children with child 
labor using 2013 Child Labor Module (MTI for its acronym in Spanish). Similar to 
Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) we assume that the migration and child labor 
choices are made in the childʑs current household. Hence, we divide the sample in 
two main groups, a) children living in nuclear households –whether both parents 
are present and whether one is absent–, and b) children living in non-nuclear 
household.  
In this paper we focus on the migrant children and how migration affects 
childrenʑs development. Migration can have positive or negative effects. Migration 
depends on family composition; the absence of a male role model might have a 
detrimental effect on boys, while the demonstration effect of migration might 
cause some children to reduce their effort in school, because they anticipate 
migrating for low-skilled work in the future Powers (2011). 
Empirical strategy must consider two mixed effects on the child labor decision. 
First, the inverse correlation between child labor and education time Bhalotra and 
Tzannatos (2003), and second, the endogeneity in the migration process, i.e., the 
emigrant population is not randomly selected, composed by individuals who have 
particular sets of skills and attributes Borjas (1999).  
Our paper will model these two decisions with a setup of a Bivariate Probit model 
composed by two binary dependent variables for the outcome (Child Labor) and a 
selection equation (Migrant Child). Hence, we estimate child labor and migration 
determinants in the outcome equation and migration decision separately. We 
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account for unobserved factors affecting both equations, and then, an error 
bivariate distribution will be estimated to account for the endogeneity effect.2  
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of 
literature about children in migration. Section 3 presents descriptive statistics 
about children in the dataset to provide context. Section 4 introduces the 
empirical model and presents the results. And finally, Section 5 concludes. 
                                    
2 A Bivariate Probit model has been used by Canagarajah & Coulombe (1997), and 
Nielsen (1998) to estimating the schooling and working decision jointly. 
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1.2. Literature review  
Theory of migration derives from neo-classical economics that suggests that 
migration is the result of household or individual decisions made by rational 
agents who seek to improve their well-being. This choice will be inducement by 
utility maximization, factor mobility, and wage differentials. However, migrants 
do not constitute a homogeneous category; migrants could be segmented along 
gender, class, ethnicity, language and religion. Woman and children remain among 
the most invisible and vulnerable groups among migrants UNESCO and UNICEF 
(2012). 
As CPI (2013) suggests ʔchildren on the moveʕ is an umbrella definition that 
brings together a wide range of motives. Following Van de Glind (2010) we can 
distinguish three categories of voluntary migration as follow: 1) children who 
migrate with their parents (i.e. family moves together), 2) independent child 
migrants, and 3) children left–behind by migrant parents (i.e. migration for one or 
both parents).3 
Regarding to other categories, it includes children who have been trafficked, 
children who migrate and children displaced by conflict and natural disasters, 
domestic violence, child fostering, learning experience, familyʑs survival strategy, 
and others Van de Glind (2010). Some of the children are at risk to have their 
rights violated, especially those exploited on child labor IPEC (2012).   
Also, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) suggest that migration makes children 
increasingly vulnerable to child labor. It has been argued that children from larger 
households are more likely to work, because fewer resources have to be assigned 
among more household members. Another negative effect can be observed in 
educational outcomes, e.g. in some cases migrant students are forced to repeat the 
same grade, regardless of their age or learning needs, due to inflexible school 
procedures and the absence of remedial classes that address studentsʑ learning 
deficits  UNESCO (2013), or due to missing weeks or months of the school year to 
                                    
3 Independent child migrant may also be a part of a familyʑs survival strategy as the 
migration of a child decrease the dependency ratio in the household, even when the child 
does not earn enough to wave. In addition, some children are able to save and send 
remittances, sometimes contributing to the education of their siblings (Van de Glind, 
2010 p. 7). 
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accompany their parents to the destination site when the migration cycles begin 
Coffey (2013). 
There are several plausible mechanisms that could lead from child migration to 
poor outcomes. Migration may lead children to forget what they have learned in 
school, or prevent them from developing relationships with teacher and classmates 
that help them progress through school. Upon returning to their home villages, 
migrant children face multiple difficulties. For example, migrant children 
experience learning difficulties that results from attendance disruptions Gindling 
and Poggio (2010). 
In the case of Mexico, previous studies have examined the effects of migration of 
parents, Antman (2010) explores the short–run effects of a fatherʑs U.S. 
migrations on his childrenʑs schooling and child labor. Their results suggest of 
children decreasing their study hours and participation in schooling in response to 
a fatherʑs absence, especially for younger children. While for sons aged 12-15 years 
increase their works hours and child labor participation outside the home.  
In addition, McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) find that a household having a 
migrant member lower the chances to both boys and girls of completing high 
school, also increases their probability of entering the labor force. With respect to 
children in migrant households, Hanson and Woodruuf (2003) show that children 
will significantly complete fewer years of schooling. In addition, they find that the 
migrant from the household is correlated with more schooling for children with 
mother with lower education level.  
Opposite this results, Malone (2007) finds that a fatherʑs absence due to migration 
is likely to have a positive effect on childrenʑs schooling, as a result of remittances, 
motherʑs are more likely to see education as one of the primary uses of extra 
income from abroad. Improvements in childʑs educational attainment may 
therefore be more likely to occur when the fathers migrates, leaving the use of 
remittances and determination of resources for mothers.   
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1.3. Data  
1.3.1 Child labor module M TI–ENOE  
The used data come from 2013 Child Labor Module (MTI, for its acronym in 
Spanish). MTI is collected in the fourth quarter as an appendix to 2013 National 
Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE, for its acronym in Spanish). 
Child Labor Module (MTI–ENOE henceforth) is conducted by INEGI to measure 
Mexicoʑs labor force and its employment characteristics. Each sample household is 
interviewed five times at three-month intervals and the sample is divided into five 
roughly equal rotation groups. 
The MTI–ENOE complements normally collected information for the population 
aged 12 to 17 years in the ENOE basic questionnaire and extends its analysis to 
include features related to labor market participation and schooling for children 
aged 5 to 11 years. The 2013 ENOEʑs fourth trimester sample of contains a total 
sample of 121,116 households. MTI–ENOE is a complete survey to identify the 
factors that determine child labor participation and schooling attendance. The 
questions are asked only to one child in every household. Because the MTI–ENOE 
is applied in households with full interview where children aged 5-17 years are 
living, the objective sample is 95,634 children.4  
1.3.2 Children imm igration using M TI–EN OE 
The National Survey of Demographic Dynamics (ENADID) is a national 
household survey to collect a wide range of information about population change 
in Mexico. ENADID collects the same information as the 2010 census: age at 
migration, state of origin for the migrant, month and year of departure, current 
residence, and, if the international migrant is back to Mexico, return date to 
Mexico. ENADID asked residence over the five years previous to the survey, while 
Census additionally asks residence on the previous year. However, ENADID and 
Mexican Population Census do not include detailed information about a labor 
force and its employment characteristics for children population.   
                                    
4 The 2013 MTI was designed by an inter-institutional working team of technicians, led 
by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare and the National Institute of Statistics and 
Geography, with advice from the ILO and UNICEF 
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Compared to ENADID and Mexican Population Census, ENOE is limited to 
identify migration movements. ENOE does not collect information on previous 
residence, but we can measure only movements into and out the existing 
households. 
ENOE let us identify new arriving families in the surveyed households. To 
measure children in immigration is used the question of residency status that 
refers to the previous year of the survey. There are three possible values: if the 
value that stores this field is 1, the child is an habitual resident; if the value is 2, 
he is a definitive absent; and if the value is 3, he is a new resident. So, we define 
immigrant children as the cases where he is a new resident.  
Given the limitations of the databases to jointly measure child labor and 
migration, in this paper we will use ENOE data. Then to verify the validity of our 
measurement, we calculate rates of immigration per state comparing information 
from ENOE and Mexican Population Census, because both are analogous in terms 
of the previous residence one year before the survey; although each refers to the 
immigration movements in 2012 and 2009 respectively.   
Graph 1 shows the comparison between both sources of information. Quintana 
Roo and Baja California Norte are the states that host the largest percentage of 
immigrants while Queretaro has the lowest immigrant rate; facts that can be 
identified from both datasets. Eight states differ by 0.1 or 0.2 percentage points 
(pp), while the rest differs in no more than 1.5 pp. Even though, temporal 
comparison between datasets is not the same year. ENOE seems a good 
approximation to the measure immigration rates among states because the 
absolute differences are relatively small. 
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Graph 1. Children immigration  statistics in Mexico   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Percentage of immigrant children aged 5-17      
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2013 MTI–ENOE, and 2010 Census 
 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based 2010 Census, 2013 MTI–ENOE 
From now on we are referring only to the information obtained from MTI-ENOE 
dataset. ENOE obtains the information from 29,302,018 households, from which 
361,568 are immigrant households, and represent 1.23% of the total households. 
The immigration movement is basically within the same state, intrastate 85.5%, 
while 14.5% corresponds to families that arrived from a different state in Mexico, 
defined as interstate immigration.   
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This pattern is also estimated with the ENADID dataset.5 Graph 2 shows that 
Quintana Roo, Baja California Norte, Guerrero, Nuevo Leon, and Nayarit are the 
states with the largest intrastate immigration ranging from 2.7% to 3.7%. 
Quintana Roo and Guerrero have as the principal activity of the tourism, as well 
as, Baja California Norte and Nayarit but also these states have an industrial 
development; Nuevo Leon is one of the principal industrial states in the country. 
Other states such as Coahuila, Sinaloa, Baja California Sur, and Tabasco have 
high rates of intrastate immigration from 2.9% to 3.1%. Colima, Baja California 
Norte, Durango, and Quintana Roo show large rates of interstate immigration, 
1.3%, 1%, 0.8% and 0.8%, respectively. 
Graph 2. Children immigration by origin   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE  
                                    
5  According to the 2011 ENADID, one in three children under 15 years recorded change 
in the place of residence; 92.3%, 6.4% and 1.3% represents, intrastate, interstate, and 
international immigration, respectively.   
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There are several reasons for the families to migrate, we observe that there are 
states that attract people because of the tourism, industry development and other 
economic activity that generate high value added. Besides the stateʑs environment 
there are family reasons to migrate which depend on the family structure. A 
nuclear family is composed by father, mother and children. In some nuclear could 
be absent one of the parents, or could have no children in the household; the 
relevant condition is that if the family moves they will go together and share the 
same household, in our sample represent 24.05% of the immigrant households. 
Also there are families composed, besides the nuclear family, by other relatives 
such as families of the siblings and parents of the head of the family or spouse, 
they formed extended families, representing 75.67% of the immigrant households. 
In this case, we can infer that children migrate with or without the family but 
stay with relatives. The rest 0.31% are children immigrants that arrived to non-
relatives households.  
Table 1 shows the main reasons that children in immigrant households answered. 
One of the reasons is to meet the family and other reasons. It is surprising that a 
low percentage declares job and to study reasons. Although, it is evident that 
these percentages are larger when they arrived to extend families 1.86% and 5.70% 
respectively, and when they arrive to non-relatives family is 8.63% for job and 
6.92% for study reasons.  Even though children may not reveal that the reason to 
migrate is to work or to study; the fact is that some of them are working. The 
MTI–ENOE allows us not only counting them but also analyzing their labor 
conditions. 
Using the MTI–ENOE questionnaire and the international convention, the 
definition of a child worker is a person aged from 5 to 17 years who responded to 
be performing any economic activity or have plans to do, in the previous week of 
the interview. The economic activity is the production for individual consumption 
or any other action intending to produce or provide goods and services to the 
market. These activities may be paid or unpaid. The calculation does not include 
child workers who engage in activities that form part of survival strategies in poor 
families, such as: looking after cars parked in the street; cleaning windshields at 
traffic lights; singing in public transport or other types of street entertainment.6 
  
                                    
6 This information is unavailable due to MTI–ENOE only covers households. 
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Table 1. Reasons for childrenʑs immigration 
Reasons 
Household composition 
Total 
Nuclear Extended Non-relatives 
Job 0.58 % 1.86 % 8.63 % 1.57 %  
Study 2.32 % 5.70 % 6.92 % 4.89 %  
Married 2.74 % 6.71 % - 5.74 %  
Divorce 0.91 % 0.36 % - 0.49 %  
Health problems - 0.07 % - 0.05 % 
Meet with family 56.39 % 52.65 % 84.44 %- 53.65 %  
Insecurity 0.12 % 0.04 % - 0.06 %  
Other 36.93 % 32.61 % - 33.55 % 
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Immigrant families 87,127 274,441 1,112 362,680 
Note: Sampling weights used to compute the children population 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE 
Table 2 shows the percentage of children who are working due to their migratory 
status. It is clear that the majority of households are non–migrant, 98.77%. We 
calculated that the percentage of worker children differs between non-migrant and 
immigrant by 3.41 percent (91.40% compared to 87.96 %). Data show a larger 
percentage of children workers in immigrant households, 12.01%, and in non-
migrant households are 8.60%. Total children working rate are 8.65% independent 
on the migration status.  
Table 2. Child labor by migration status 
 
Non-migrant Immigrant Total 
Non-worker 91.40 % 87.96 % 91.35 % 
Worker 8.60 % 12.01 % 8.65 % 
Total percentage 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Total households 28,974,940 362,680 29,337,620 
Note: Sampling weights used to compute the children population 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE 
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Not only is the working status of the children in the immigrant households 
relevant, but also the number of hours that they work per week, earnings, 
education and the reasons to be working instead of studying. Table 3 shows the 
number of hours worked per week. It is evident that a large proportion of non-
migrant children work less than 24 hours per week, about 27.80% work less than 
15 hours and 15.95% work between 15 to 24 hours per week, for immigrant 
children these percentages are 11.12% and 12.40% respectively.  
The pattern changes as the weekly working hours increase, since children 
immigrant work longer hours, 9.17% work between 25 to 34 hours compared to 
6.80% of non-migrant children. The fact that immigrant children work the longest 
is showed when we compare the percentage of children that work more than 35 
hours per week, because the percentage is two times the percentage of non-
migrant children.  
Table 3. Worked hours per week by migration status 
Working hours Non-migrant Immigrant Total 
Less than 15 hrs 27.80 % 11.12 % 27.51 %  
15 to 24 hrs 15.95 % 12.40 % 15.89 %  
25 to 34 hrs 6.80 % 9.17 % 6.84 %  
35 or more hrs 28.76 % 58.14 % 29.27 %  
Irregular 19.75 % 6.61 % 19.52 %  
Unknown 0.94 % 2.56 % 0.97 %  
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Children 5-17 years old 2,493,017 43,676 2,536,693 
Note: Sampling weights used to compute the children population 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE 
For comparison reason it is shown the distribution of weekly working hours for 
non-migrant and immigrant children. Because it is our interest to know if the 
children receive a payment for their work that could give us a hint of why 
immigrant work longer hours than non-migrant, Graph 3 shows a comparison 
between non-migrant and immigrant children by monetary and non-monetary 
payment.   
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Graph 3. Worked hours per week by migration status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
S  Source: Authorʑs calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE 
We observe an interesting pattern; immigrant children work longer hours to 
receive a payment while non-migrant children work fewer hours per week for a 
payment. Also we can notice that a larger percentage of non-migrant children 
work fewer hours and mainly do not get a monetary payment. This fact may 
indicate that children may work for a family business. The gap between the longer 
worked hours per week between immigrants and non-migrants is reduced if the 
children do not receive a monetary payment.  
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In relation to the childrenʑs earnings in Table 4, we observe that there is no 
difference between the percentages of non-migrant and immigrant children that 
receive less than 1 minimum wage (mw). However, we can observe that larger 
percentages of immigrant children receive more than 1 to 3 mw. This is related to 
the longer hours worked per week relative to non-migrant children. On the 
contrary, the non-monetary payment percentage is almost two times larger for 
non-migrant children, 46.40% versus 19.00% reported by immigrant children.  
Table 4. Childrenʑs earnings by migration status 
M inimum Wage (mw) Non-migrant Immigrant Total 
Less than 1 mw 28.38 % 28.11 % 28.38 % 
1 to 2 mw  17.01 % 31.21 % 17.25 % 
2 to 3 mw 5.29 % 14.06 % 5.44 % 
More than 3 mw 1.14 % 6.36 % 1.23 %  
Non monetary payment 46.40 % 19.00 % 45.93 %  
Unknown 1.77 % 1.27 % 1.77 %  
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Children 5-17 years old 2,493,017 43,676 2,536,693 
Note: Calculated using the expansion factors.   
Source: Authorʑs calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE 
From previous tables we have seen that the main reason for children to work is to 
get a monetary payment. Table 5 shows that if a child is immigrant one of the 
reasons to work is because the household needs extra income, 12.10% compared to 
non-migrant children, 8.61%. However, the main reason to work, when the child is 
immigrant, is because he needs to finance his own expenditures, 38.96%, also it is 
for the non-migrant children workers but lower in magnitude, 22.98%. This fact 
confirms that migrant children workers appear vulnerable if the house to which 
they move becomes unable to maintain their costs. If the household needs 
workers, perhaps for family business, then a larger percentage of children respond 
it as one of the reasons to work, 22.55%; similar percentage is responded if they 
like to help in the household, 22.49%. For immigrant children workers these 
percentages are smaller, 18.49% and 14.61%, respectively. 
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Table 5. Childrenʑs reasons to work by migration status 
Reasons to work Non-migrant Immigrant Total 
Household needs income 8.61 % 12.10 % 8.67 % 
Household needs workers 22.55 % 18.49 % 22.48 %  
Learn and trade 13.59 % 6.46 % 13.47 %  
Own expenditure 22.98 % 38.96 % 23.25 % 
Like to help  22.49 % 14.61 % 22.35 % 
Other  9.78 % 9.40 % 9.78 %  
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Children 5-17 years old 2,493,017 43,676 2,536,693 
Note: Calculated using the expansion factors.   
Source: Authorʑs calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE 
Education could be one of the reasons for children to move to another city. It was 
not one of the main reasons reported moving tough. Table 6 confirms that a 
larger percentage of the immigrant children are not attending school, 19.93%, 
compared to non-migrant children who show a lower percentage, 7.07%. 
Nevertheless, the majority of children would be attending the school, non-migrant 
92.93% and immigrant children, 80.07%. 
Table 6. School attendance by migration status 
Attending to school Non-migrant Immigrant Total 
No 7.07 19.93 7.23  
Yes 92.93 80.07 92.77  
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Total Households 28,974,940 362,680 29,337,620 
Note: Calculated using the expansion factors.   
Source: Authorʑs calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE 
Previous table does not tell much about the education level that children are 
attending. Table 7 shows the attained level of education of the children by their 
migration status. Children face a larger opportunity cost of studying as they get 
older, so then it is likely that migrant children would have at least some level of 
education, and then migrate to work. The self-selection of migrant is related to 
the education level of the migrants; those who are more able would be more likely 
to migrate.   
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From the data we can infer that non-migrant children are more concentrated on 
the lower levels of incomplete attained education, such as no schooling years, 
partial primary and partial secondary relative to immigrant children. On the 
contrary, larger percentages of immigrant children have attained complete 
primary, secondary and high school or more. Therefore, immigrant children seem 
to have higher education than non-migrant children. 
Table 7. Educational attainment by migration status 
Education level Non-migrant Immigrant Total 
Non schooling 18.88 % 16.77 % 18.86 % 
Partial primary  42.15 % 37.72 % 42.09 % 
Completed primary  9.75 % 10.28 % 9.76 % 
Partial secondary 15.07 % 13.46 % 15.05 % 
Completed secondary 8.36 % 14.68 % 8.43 % 
High school or more  5.77 % 7.09 % 5.78 % 
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Children 5-17 years old 2,493,017 43,676 2,536,693 
Note: Calculated using the expansion factors, exclude 0.02% matching to Unknown 
category.  
Source: Authorʑs calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE 
According to the evidence presented migration does not necessarily is accompanied 
with high school attendance. In fact, there are two trends of school dropout 
percentages, see Graph 4. The first trend, defined for children who are 6 to 11 
years old, reveals that non-migrant children have the highest dropout rates. The 
second trend, for children who are 12 years old or more, the dropout rates are 
larger for immigrant children. 
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Note: Only include children currently not attending to school. 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE 
It is remarkable that the highest dropout school rate is at 15 years old and is 
larger for immigrant children, 42.8%, compared to 31.8% of non-migrant. In this 
sense, the immigrant children are more vulnerable, most of all, if they are 
teenagers. 
Although compulsory education in Mexico is until secondary, the dropout 
attendance rates are higher in this level SEP (2013). This pattern could be 
explained because the eldest children became more productive and therefore the 
opportunity cost to keep them in the school it increases UCW (2012). 
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1.4. Empirical strategy   
1.4.1 Identification  
It is assumed that the heads of the family. Mother and father, would decide what 
is best for the family to improve their income and living conditions. Then child 
labor and migration are two decisions that children cannot make by themselves. 
Family would choose whether to send the children to school, to work, or both, and 
whether to move to another city to improve the family income.7 
The migration process involves different factors that may result in higher child 
labor, although the opposite is also expected if the purpose of moving is for 
getting higher education. Family income is relevant to determine how child labor 
and migration are related. On one hand, if a family has restrictions for moving to 
another city to get better job conditions and higher wages, it would be likely that 
children would be sent to work. On the other hand, a family may decide moving 
to another city but this change creates imbalances on the familyʑs income that 
makes them send their children to work instead to the school. Also a family may 
move not only to increase family income but to get schooling opportunities for 
their children. Then the association between migration and child labor could be in 
both directions. 
The question to be answered is whether migrant families, and therefore, migrant 
children are more likely to work. This paper will try to model these two decisions 
as independent, however, there are unobserved factors affecting both child labor 
and migration decisions. For example, father, mother and childrenʑs ability, 
attitude toward improving opportunities, preference to study in better quality 
schools, and the like.  
Endogeneity of the migration process, including the fact that migrant households 
and members self–selection into this status on the basis of both observed and 
unobserved characteristics, complicates identification of the causal effect of 
migration on child development. The empirical strategy to deal with child labor 
                                    
7 Van de Glind (2010) stated that children during the migration process are exposed to 
high risk of violence, abuse and worst forms of child labor, especially if they migrate 
without the family. However, the available information cannot let us analyze this type of 
children migration, instead using ENOE will let us to analyze closely child labor 
conditional to the migration status of the family. 
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and migration to account for the endogeneity is to estimate child labor and 
migration determinants separately but considering that there are unobserved 
factors affecting both equations, and then an error bivariate distribution will be 
estimated to account for the endogeneity effect.  
1.4.2 Recursive bivariate probit model  
The difference between univariate and bivariate Probit is the potential nonzero 
correlation (ρ≠0) between the unobserved explanatory factors in the two 
equations. Estimating both equations as a system will not affect the consistency of 
individual Probit estimates. More details about the Recursive Bivariate Probit 
model see: Maddala and Lee (1976), Greene (1998). 
The estimated model is composed by two binary dependent variables for the 
outcome and selection equations. The outcome equation has as dependent 
variable, Y1, representing the Child Labor variable that takes the value of 1 and 0 
otherwise; and the selection equation has also a binary dependent variable, Y2, if 
the individual is a Migrant Child takes the value of 1 and 0 otherwise. Hence, the 
latent variable      represents the decision of child labor and the latent        
represents the decision to migrate.  
The set up for the model is as follows: 
 YY 1211
'
1
*
1 iiii   xβ  (1) 
otherwise  0 , 0Y    1Y *i1i1  if  
    Y 22
'
2
*
2 iii  xβ   (2) 
otherwise  0 , 0Y      1Y *i2i2  if  
 0),(),( 212211  xxxx ii ōEōE  
1),(),( 212211  xxxx ii ōVarōVar  
n1,2,3,...,i   ;   ),,( 2121  ρōōCov ii xx  
The model accounts for the effect that migration has on child labor, since yi2 is 
also included in the first equation as an endogenous variable. This is a recursive, 
simultaneous bivariate probit model, where Xi1 and Xi2 are row vectors of 
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exogenous variables which determine respectively, Child Labor and Migrant Child 
propensities, and (β1) and (β2) are associated parameter column vectors.  
The vectors xi1 and xi2 represent the set of independent observable variables that 
are affecting both decisions to work and to migrate. For identification purposes, 
we need at least one different independent variable in the selection equation. This 
two-step procedure represents an attempt to deal with the simultaneity problem 
Greene (1998).  
Another important variable is the effect of children school attendance on migrant 
household decision. In equation (2) school attendance has an effect on the decision 
to migrate; for example, family can send the children outside or migrate together 
to have access to school or to a better school Hashim (2005), or, parents who care 
more strongly about education of their children may migrate in order to earn 
income that can be used to pay for schooling expenses McKenzie and Rapoport, 
(2011). Since most data sets describe an inverse correlation between child labor 
and schooling attendance at the micro-level Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003), we do 
not include school attendance in the outcome equation.  
Family composition has important implications, for example, the absence of a 
male role model might have a detrimental effect on boys, while the demonstration 
effect of migration might cause some children to reduce their effort in school, 
because they anticipate migrating for low-skilled work in the future Powers 
(2011). Since child labor and migration decisions are both made in the childʑs 
current household, we divide the sample in two groups, a) children living in 
nuclear household –whether both parents are present and whether one can be 
absent–, and b) children living in extended families, non-nuclear household.  
Table A1 describes the variables in the model; the dependents variables are the 
choices to send a child to work and the household migration decision, and the 
independent variables are the childʑs age, gender, householdʑs size, householdʑs 
composition, householdʑs head completed grades in school, locality size and 
regions. And Table A2 presents a summary statistics for the dependent and 
independent variables used the regression analysis. It also summarizes some of the 
other descriptive statistics that have been used to contextualize the main results.  
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1.4.3 Results   
Tables 8 and 9 show the marginal effects on the probability that children –aged 
12 and 17 years old– work conditional to their migration status and other 
independent variables. Table 8 shows the marginal effect applying a simple 
Probit model, while Table 9 shows the conditional marginal effect between child 
labor and migration accounting for the endogeneity effect explained in Section 
1.4.2.  
Results providing evidence that family structure is important not only on the 
decision to migrate but also the decision to work. The coefficient that relates child 
labor and migration is positive in the models presented without controlling for 
endogeneity, models (1)–(4) in Table 8, and also when controlling for 
endogeneity, models (5)–(8) in Table 9. Comparing the whole sample, the 
probability that a child works is estimated at 1.05%, if he is immigrant; while the 
coefficient when we control for endogeneity effect became larger, 5.16%.  
The coefficient of a nuclear family, relative to extended families, is negative 
indicating that it is a factor that may reduce child labor, although it is not 
statistically significant when considering the whole sample. Therefore, we divide 
the sample in nuclear families to incorporate three possibilities: parents present in 
the household, father is absent, and mother is absent in the nuclear household.   
Results show that the probability that a child works –given that he is an 
immigrant– is positive and larger. In fact, if parents are present in the nuclear 
family, model (2), the probability of child labor and immigration is 2.42% while 
controlling for endogeneity is even larger, 7.48%, model (6). Comparing 
uncontrolled models where the father is absent, model (3), and the model (4) 
where the mother is absent, the probability that an immigrant child works is 
larger when the father is absent than the other case.  
For the models where we controlled for endogeneity, (7) and (8), we found the 
same pattern, but the coefficients are much larger than any other model, 9.88% 
and 9.28% respectively. Without conditioning to immigrant children, we also 
found that that the probability of child labor is lower if the household is nuclear 
with parents present, but larger if the father is absent; in magnitude these 
coefficients are smaller than the case of immigrant children.  
22 
These results provide evidence that it is more likely that children work if they are 
immigrant and if the live in households with the mother being the head of the 
family. We can also infer that estimating a joint probability between child labor 
and migration that accounts for the unobservable affecting both decisions deliver 
better estimated coefficients, since the Rho (ρ) coefficient is statistically significant 
different from zero and the log-likelihood tests are larger than the Probit models, 
which do not control for endogeneity.  
In general, we can also see that control variables coefficients on comparable 
models have the same direction for the child labor probability. In the case of the 
Biprobit models, the coefficients are larger in magnitude and have smaller 
standard errors relative to the Probit models. For this reason, we will focus on the 
interpretation of the models (5)–(8) in Table 9. The coefficients shown on the 
model (5), which considers the whole sample, are smaller than the estimated 
coefficients obtained for nuclear families. In fact, when we compare the coefficients 
for nuclear families, the largest coefficients, in absolute value, are estimated for 
nuclear families with father absent while the lowest in nuclear families with 
mother absent.   
Similar to Grootaert and Kanbur (1995), Jensen and Nielsen (1997), Rosati and 
Rossi (2001), we found that the probability of child labor of a immigrant child is 
higher compared to a non migrant child, this probability increases with his age 
and it is larger for boys relative to girls, see Graph A3. 
We did not include a measure of the family income; the reason is because it is not 
completely identified from the dataset used, especially for the cases where the 
children do not migrate with their family. If this is the case, it would be 
convenient to include childrenʑs wage. However, in the descriptive section we 
found that children work to get a monetary payment, not only to increase family 
income but also to finance their expenditures, mainly if they are immigrant. Then, 
it is not clear whether to include it as a measure of the family income.  
To avoid a larger measurement error, instead, we include a binary variable 
indicating whether the head of the family is working. We assume that the mother 
is the head of the household in the model (7) since a father is absent, and the 
father is the head of the family if the mother is absent, model (8). For the model 
(6) where both are present they self-declare who is the head of the family. The 
results imply that if the head of the family is employed the probability of child 
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labor increases; although this effect seems counterintuitive. It is consistent with 
Basu and Van (1998) argument that child and adult work is complementing. 
Regarding the education, we found that the probability of child labor is reduced if 
the education level of the head of the family increases relative to the head of the 
family with no education. Similar to a previous paper based in Mexico Hanson 
and Woodruff (2003), McKenzie and Rapoport (2011), the probability of child 
labor is reduced in larger magnitude in localities with more than 100,000 
populations relative to localities with less than 2,500 inhabitants. Then, the 
probability of child labor is larger in rural localities relative to urbanized areas. 
By region we observe that in the Pacific and South regions have the largest 
probabilities of child labor relative to Northern states. Comparing the four models, 
it is remarkable that the probability that children work is about 7.69% in the 
families with the father absent in the Pacific region relative to northern states. 
Also the probability of child labor is larger in Center and North Center relative to 
Northern states. Only in the Capital, Distrito Federal and Estado de Mexico, the 
probability of child labor is lower than in the Northern states, although none of 
the coefficients are statistically significant. 
Finally, in Biprobit models Table 9 we can account the indirect effect of 
education on child labor. We build a set of interaction binary variables combining 
currently school attendance and highest level attained. We observe an inverse 
relationship between both variables as we expect, however, this effect is not 
homogeneous for certain educational outcomes. However, older children may be 
more apt to engage in work than in school not only because they may have 
already completed at primary or secondary school, rather because they are more 
productive in labor activities. 
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Table 8. A probit model analysis of the decision to child labor 
 M odel 1 
All sample 
M odel 2 
Nuclear Hh with 
both parentʑs 
M odel 3 
Nuclear Hh with 
fatherʑs absent 
M odel 4 
Nuclear Hh with 
motherʑs absent 
 Coeff StdError Coeff StdError Coeff StdError Coeff StdError 
1 if child immigrant  0.0105** (2.157) 0.0242** (2.525) 0.0250** (2.612) 0.0242** (2.522) 
1 if male child  0.0359*** (28.514) 0.0339*** (22.659) 0.0340*** (22.681) 0.0339*** (22.630) 
Age 0.0096*** (6.870) 0.0091*** (5.403) 0.0091*** (5.405) 0.0093*** (5.482) 
Age squared 0.0002*** (4.262) 0.0002*** (3.530) 0.0002*** (3.536) 0.0002*** (3.490) 
1 if nuclear household  -0.00114 (-0.765)       
1 if Hh with both parents   -0.0122*** (-5.761)     
1 if Hh with father's absent     0.0118*** (5.445)   
1 if Hh with mother's absent       0.00812 (1.362) 
Household size 0.00102** (2.898) 0.0037*** (6.672) 0.0036*** (6.457) 0.0027*** (5.121) 
1 if Hh head employed  0.0315*** (16.883) 0.0270*** (10.394) 0.0270*** (10.372) 0.0247*** (9.612) 
1 if Hh head's partial primary  -0.0146*** (-5.632) -0.0104** (-2.838) -0.0105** (-2.861) -0.0110** (-3.003) 
1 if Hh head's full primary  -0.0222*** (-8.770) -0.0218*** (-6.151) -0.0219*** (-6.193) -0.0226*** (-6.384) 
1 if Hh head's partial secondary  -0.0246*** (-6.390) -0.0240*** (-4.961) -0.0241*** (-4.997) -0.0251*** (-5.192) 
1 if Hh head's full secondary  -0.0346*** (-13.648) -0.0348*** (-9.946) -0.0350*** (-10.006) -0.0357*** (-10.194) 
1 if Hh head's preparatory or more  -0.0578*** (-21.299) -0.0571*** (-15.630) -0.0573*** (-15.687) -0.0587*** (-16.080) 
1 if loc with 100 000 or more pop -0.0237*** (-14.609) -0.0246*** (-12.558) -0.0247*** (-12.565) -0.0245*** (-12.470) 
1 if loc with 15 000 to 99 999 pop  -0.0152*** (-7.287) -0.0170*** (-6.750) -0.0170*** (-6.749) -0.0169*** (-6.703) 
1 if loc with 2 500 to 14 999 pop  -0.0156*** (-7.659) -0.0145*** (-5.983) -0.0145*** (-5.987) -0.0146*** (-6.025) 
Center North  0.0149*** (7.241) 0.0132*** (5.372) 0.0132*** (5.366) 0.0134*** (5.469) 
Center  0.0150*** (6.360) 0.0157*** (5.599) 0.0157*** (5.588) 0.0163*** (5.780) 
Capital  -0.00112 (-0.370) -0.00127 (-0.344) -0.00131 (-0.354) -0.00118 (-0.319) 
Gulf  0.0136*** (6.035) 0.0132*** (4.877) 0.0132*** (4.882) 0.0132*** (4.849) 
South  0.0190*** (8.462) 0.0163*** (6.038) 0.0163*** (6.042) 0.0168*** (6.184) 
Pacific  0.0318*** (14.526) 0.0308*** (11.808) 0.0308*** (11.804) 0.0312*** (11.907) 
Observations 95,496  67,305  67,305  67,305  
Log likelihood -21,708.1  -15,162.2  -15,164.0  -15,177.7  
McFadden's R2 0.202  0.194  0.194  0.193  
R Count 91.85%  92.06%  92.06%  92.06%  
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2013 MTI/ENOE.  
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Table 9. A bivariate probit model analysis of the decision to child labor 
 M odel 5 
All sample  
M odel 6 
Hh with both 
parentʑs 
M odel 7 
Hh with fatherʑs 
absent 
M odel 8 
Hh with motherʑs 
absent 
Coeff StdError Coeff StdError Coeff StdError Coeff StdError 
1 if child immigrant  0.0516*** (7.046) 0.0748*** (4.722) 0.0988*** (5.052) 0.0928*** (4.386) 
1 if male child  0.0521*** (9.904) 0.0582*** (6.211) 0.0717*** (6.630) 0.0681*** (5.806) 
Age 0.0144*** (5.161) 0.0159*** (3.811) 0.0196*** (3.934) 0.0190*** (3.754) 
Age squared 0.00035*** (4.214) 0.00043*** (3.324) 0.00053*** (3.366) 0.00050** (3.212) 
1 if nuclear household -0.00173 (-0.795)       
1 if Hh with both parents    -0.0231*** (-4.229)     
1 if Hh with father's absent      0.0229*** (4.060)   
1 if Hh with mother's absent        0.0152 (1.260) 
Household size 0.0014** (2.752) 0.0064*** (4.648) 0.0076*** (4.554) 0.0055*** (3.756) 
1 if Hh head employed  0.0357*** (8.733) 0.0383*** (5.399) 0.0481*** (5.636) 0.0423*** (5.002) 
1 if Hh head's partial primary school  -0.0184*** (-5.345) -0.0165** (-2.743) -0.0207** (-2.791) -0.0206** (-2.825) 
1 if Hh head's full primary school  -0.0273*** (-7.068) -0.0329*** (-4.591) -0.0413*** (-4.808) -0.0403*** (-4.474) 
1 if Hh head's partial secondary school  -0.0273*** (-6.290) -0.0337*** (-4.282) -0.0427*** (-4.450) -0.0418*** (-4.197) 
1 if Hh head's full secondary school  -0.0431*** (-8.364) -0.0541*** (-5.413) -0.0676*** (-5.755) -0.0654*** (-5.164) 
1 if Hh headʑs preparatory or more school  -0.0660*** (-9.193) -0.0851*** (-5.875) -0.106*** (-6.320) -0.103*** (-5.524) 
1 if loc with 100 000 or more pop -0.0350*** (-8.536) -0.0431*** (-5.736) -0.0530*** (-6.053) -0.0502*** (-5.408) 
1 if loc with 15 000 to 99 999 pop  -0.0193*** (-6.377) -0.0262*** (-4.739) -0.0326*** (-4.925) -0.0308*** (-4.502) 
1 if loc with 2 500 to 14 999 pop  -0.0197*** (-6.583) -0.0226*** (-4.507) -0.0282*** (-4.670) -0.0270*** (-4.329) 
Center North  0.0236*** (5.591) 0.0241*** (3.985) 0.0295*** (4.109) 0.0288*** (3.926) 
Center  0.0244*** (5.010) 0.0299*** (4.039) 0.0364*** (4.177) 0.0361*** (4.016) 
Capital  -0.00112 (-0.262) -0.00202 (-0.323) -0.00257 (-0.334) -0.00219 (-0.298) 
Gulf  0.0219*** (4.872) 0.0246*** (3.728) 0.0301*** (3.831) 0.0285*** (3.645) 
South  0.0319*** (6.136) 0.0310*** (4.259) 0.0379*** (4.415) 0.0371*** (4.204) 
Pacific  0.0586*** (8.232) 0.0637*** (5.731) 0.0769*** (6.029) 0.0743*** (5.496) 
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Table 9. A bivariate probit model analysis of the decision to child labor (continuation)  
 M odel 5 
All sample  
M odel 6 
Hh with both 
parentʑs 
M odel 7 
Hh with fatherʑs 
absent 
M odel 8 
Hh with motherʑs 
absent 
Coeff StdError Coeff StdError Coeff StdError Coeff StdError 
1 if child immigrant         
Currently schooled*Partial primary -0.0149*** (-5.347) -0.0123*** (-1.954) -0.0152*** (-1.910) -0.0143*** (-1.879) 
Currently schooled*Full primary -0.0166*** (-4.920) -0.0130*** (-1.869) -0.0162*** (-1.826) -0.0152*** (-1.799) 
Currently schooled*Partial Secondary -0.0159*** (-5.186) -0.0077*** (-1.511) -0.0096*** (-1.486) -0.0089*** (-1.468) 
Currently schooled*Full secondary -0.0148*** (-4.255) -0.0132*** (-1.735) -0.0165*** (-1.695) -0.0154*** (-1.673) 
Currently schooled*Preparatory  -0.0144*** (-4.029) -0.0072*** (-1.196) -0.0089*** (-1.181) -0.0084*** (-1.170) 
Observations 95,496  67,305  67,305  67,305  
Log likelihood -28273.0  -16,972.0  -1,6973.8  -16,987.6  
Rho (p) -0.598  -0.403  -0.404  -0.398  
Chi2 47.79  5.323  5.351  5.216  
Note: Bivariate Probit model corresponds to conditional probability Proby1=1, y2=1x1, x2.  
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2013 MTI/ENOE 
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1.5. Conclusions 
This paper set out in a little explored area, the effect of household immigration 
on child labor. We set up a model that accounts for the endogeneity effect of 
migration and other unobservable factor affecting both decisions, the decision   
to child labor and decision to migrate. Our main substantive findings is that 
compared to non migrant children, immigrants have more propensity to child 
labor and, this condition is robust to a variety of specifications and controls.  
For nuclear household, this propensity increase in households with fatherʑs 
absent, that is, in household where the mother is the head of the family. 
Although we did not include family income, households with mother as the head 
have lower income than in households with the father as the head of the family. 
We also found results consistent to previous evidence on child labor that the 
probability to work increases with age, it is larger for boys, and it is larger in 
rural areas. In fact, we found that immigrant children are a vulnerable group, 
even if they seem to have a higher level of education than non-migrant, they 
work longer hours for a payment.  
Similar other countries, child labor in Mexico are still observed, even less than 
the age permitted by law. Among children, we found that immigrants are the 
most observed vulnerability. If child labor is an obstacle to social and economic 
development, and also drives possible intergenerational transmission or poverty. 
The Mexican government should ensure the implementation of the UN 
conventions on the Rights of the Child (UN CRC) and the ILO Child Labor 
Conventions (No. 138, No. 182). Also, develop labor monitoring mechanism and 
oversight of child labor in the informal economy, where most children work. 
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1.7 Appendix    
Table A1. Variables definition   
Variables definition 
Dependent variables 
Child labor:  1 if child labor and, 0 otherwise  
Immigrant Household: 1 if immigrant household, 0 otherwise   
Independent variables  
a) Childrenʑs characteristics  
1 if male child: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise  
1 if currently schooling: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
1 if partial primary: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
1 if full primary: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
1 if partial secondary: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
1 if full secondary: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
1 if preparatory or more: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
b) Household characteristics  
Household size: Number of members living in the household.  
1 if nucleus Household: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
Hh head earnings  
1 if Hh head employed: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
1 if Hh with both parents: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
1 if Hh with father's absent: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
1 if Hh with mother's absent: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
1 if Hh head's not schooling: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
1 if Hh head's partial primary school: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
1 if Hh head's full primary school: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
1 if Hh head's partial secondary school: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
1 if Hh head's full secondary school: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
1 if Hh head's preparatory or + school: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise 
c) Other controls  
Less than 2 500 hab 
2,500 to 14 999 hab 
15 000 to 99 999 hab 
100 000 or more hab 
North: BC, SON, CHIH, NL, TAM, COAH. 
Center North: DGO, ZAC, SLP, AGS, GTO, QRO. 
Center: HGO, TLAX, PUE, MOR. 
Capital: DF, MEX. 
Gulf: VER, TAB, CAM, ZAC, QROO.  
South: MICH, GRO, OAX, CHIS. 
Pacific: JAL, NAY, SIN, BCS, COL. 
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Table A2. Summary descriptive statistics 
Variable min max mean SD N  
1 if child labor 0 1 0.083 0.275 95,496 
1 if child immigrant  0 1 0.013 0.113 95,496 
Age  5 17 11.063 3.712 95,496 
1 if male child 0 1 0.510 0.500 95,496 
1 if child currently schooled 0 1 0.932 0.252 95,496 
1 if child non schooling 0 1 0.185 0.389 95,496 
1 if child with partial primary school 0 1 0.418 0.493 95,496 
1 if child with completed primary school 0 1 0.096 0.294 95,496 
1 if child with partial secondary school 0 1 0.151 0.358 95,496 
1 if child with completed secondary school 0 1 0.088 0.283 95,496 
1 if preparatory or more schooling 0 1 0.062 0.241 95,496 
Household size  2 24 5.196 1.829 95,496 
1 if nuclear household  0 1 0.705 0.456 95,496 
1 if nuclear household with both parents 0 1 0.860 0.347 67,305 
1 if nuclear household with fatherʑs absent 0 1 0.128 0.335 67,305 
1 if nuclear household with motherʑs absent 0 1 0.011 0.107 67,305 
1 if male household head  0 1 0.773 0.419 95,496 
1 if Hh headʑs employed 0 1 0.843 0.364 95,496 
1 if Hh head's non schooling 0 1 0.055 0.229 95,496 
1 if Hh head's partial primary school 0 1 0.127 0.333 95,496 
1 if Hh head's full primary school 0 1 0.191 0.393 95,496 
1 if Hh head's partial secondary school 0 1 0.034 0.182 95,496 
1 if Hh head's full secondary school 0 1 0.302 0.459 95,496 
1 if Hh head's preparatory or more school 0 1 0.291 0.454 95,496 
1 if locality 100 000 or more population 0 1 0.545 0.498 95,496 
1 if locality 15 000 to 99 999 population 0 1 0.132 0.339 95,496 
1 if locality 2 500 to 14 999 population 0 1 0.133 0.340 95,496 
1 if locality less than 2 500 population 0 1 0.189 0.392 95,496 
North  0 1 0.177 0.382 95,496 
Center North 0 1 0.208 0.406 95,496 
Center 0 1 0.124 0.330 95,496 
Capital 0 1 0.067 0.250 95,496 
Gulf 0 1 0.142 0.349 95,496 
South 0 1 0.143 0.350 95,496 
Pacific 0 1 0.140 0.347 95,496 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2013 MTI/ENOE. 
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Chapter 2. Intergenerational transm ission of informal employment 
in M exico. A  lim ited choice or better income prospects? 
Intergenerational transmission of informal 
employment in Mexico. A limited choice or 
better income prospects?  
2.1 Introduction 
The intergenerational mobility (IGM, henceforth) is measured by the connection 
between parentsʑ and adult childrenʑs socioeconomic status, where higher 
association means less social mobility Corak (2004). According to Torche (2013), 
this socioeconomic standing is captured by different measures were the most 
common are: individual earnings and family income, social class, and 
occupational status.  
Recent evidence show that family background has a dramatic impact on the 
likelihood of remaining in the same sector of employment. In particular, evidence 
shows that having a self–employment or informal occupation parents makes sons 
significantly more likely to follow the same parentsʑ occupation, Hout and Rosen 
(2000), Colombier and Masclet (2008), Pasquier–Doumer, (2012). Also, some 
studies shows that informal employment is the result of an optimal choice where 
individuals expect a higher welfare than if they were wage earners or 
entrepreneurs in the formal sector Maloney and Ribeiro (1999), Maloney (2004), 
Packard (2007).  
Understanding the relationship between IGM and employment occupation is 
essential for assessing the fairness of social mobility and earnings distribution. In 
fact, the intergenerational transmission of the self–employed status is frequently 
connected with high expected earnings Fairlie and Robb (2006), Colombier and 
Masclet (2008). While there is no consensus on the voluntary nature of entry 
into informal self-employment, strong evidence points to a strong 
intergenerational transmission of employment status Pasquier–Doumer (2012). 
In Mexico, the way that social mobility has been measured depending on the 
specific aspects of social mobility of interest as well as on the available data. 
Valero and Tijerina (2003), Castillo and Vela (2013), and Velez-Grajales and 
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Velez-Grajales (2014) have been estimated a larger intergenerational social 
mobility as it relates to entrepreneurial activity, income and occupations.  
However, up to now, research regarding intergenerational transmissions of 
employment occupations has only focused on sons and parentsʑ living in the 
same household Valero and Tijerina (2003), Castillo and Vela, (2013), mainly 
because there are not data from longitudinal surveys. This paper motivates the 
use of a retrospective data collection 2011 EMOVI (Social Mobility Survey in 
Mexico, EMOVI for its acronym in Spanish). 2011 EMOVI is an attractive 
dataset for a retrospective data collection in Mexico. This survey collects current 
respondentsʑ socioeconomic data and the comparable retrospective information 
on their parentsʑ when the interviewee was 14 years old.  
This interest motivates literature in labor economics addressing the 
intergenerational relationship between parents and sons occupations. We provide 
a further examination and robust check for this possibility controlling skill level, 
parentsʑ occupation and family background. Different from the previous evidence 
in Mexico, our study differs in three ways: (3) empirical strategy aims at 
controlling as much as possible for heterogeneity sample, (1) microeconometric 
framework derives from a structural model with expected wages explicitly 
determining labor occupation decisions, (3) selectivity bias is achieved using a 
two-steep estimation following Lee (1982) procedure. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly looks at some of the 
associated literature. Section 3 introduces the model that is estimated and 
discusses its identification. Section 4 highlights a few features from the data and 
presents results. Finally, section 5 concludes.   
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2.2 Literature review 
A large number of economists suggest the existence of segmented labor markets, 
Lewis (1954), Harris and Todaro (1970), have been highlighted that developing 
countries are characterized by a dual labor market, consisting of a modern sector 
that is organized and large informal sector with a reduced amount of efficiency. 
This two groups of sectors seems to be operating in different labor markets. One 
contains the primary segment of better paid and more attractive jobs, while the 
secondary segment encompasses rather low paid, unqualified and short term jobs 
Eichhorst and Kendzia, (2014). These jobs are characterized by low (or even 
zero) marginal productivity which justifies the low wages. Hence, informal 
employment appears as a constrained choice and a large informal sector involved 
inefficiency Pasquier-Doumer, (2012), Mboutchouang et al., (2013).  
Nevertheless, recent findings for some countries show that informal employment 
is the result of an optimal choice where individuals expect a higher welfare than 
if they were wage earners or entrepreneurs in the formal sector Maloney and 
Ribeiro (1999), Packard (2007). More recent evidence views the informal sector 
as an active and voluntary entrepreneurial small firm sector, where individuals 
choose to be informal because they expect a greater welfare that if they wage–
earners of formal entrepreneurs Maloney, (2004). Hence, a proportion of informal 
occupation may reflect an efficient allocation of labor Pasquier–Doumer (2012).  
If there is no consensus on the voluntary nature to be engaged into informal 
employment and efficiency of informal production units, some stylized facts lead 
reflections toward and intergenerational transmission of informal 
entrepreneurship status De Paul, Massil, and Modeste, (2013). In the economic 
literature, the intergenerational transmission of the employed status is frequently 
connected with high expected earnings Colombier and Masclet, (2008), Fairlie 
and Robb (2006).  
Evidence from Mexico show a high correlation between self-employment and the 
informal sector of the economy, recently statistics show that almost 6 in 10 
people are in the informal sector employment (ILO, 2012). Leal-Ordoñez (2013) 
refers to four facts concerning informality in Mexico: 1) the informal sector in 
Mexico is large, 2) the distribution of labor across establishment sizes has a 
ʔmissing middleʕ, 3) informal establishments are small, and 4) informal 
establishments operate with low capital-labor ratios.  
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On this view, occupational status has an important advantage as a measure of 
economic standing and is a weighted average of the mean level of earnings and 
education of detailed occupations Torche (2013). In relation to wages differences 
between both sectors, Moreno (2007) estimate the average conditional differences 
using the Mincer equation. It corrected for selectivity to controlling the 
heterogeneity among individuals in each sector. He finds that workers with 
higher levels of education earn more in the formal sector, but, individuals with 
high school or less receive higher wages in the informal sector, these results are 
similar for woman with basic and secondary school.  
Regarding the choice of being salaried employee in the formal or informal sector, 
Huesca and Padilla (2012) use a contrafactual technique to estimate the wages 
received if the workers are employed in both sectors. They found that workers 
with high schooling attainment have more probability to work in the formal 
sector and woman with low education attainment have more likelihood to work 
in the informal sector. However, this likelihood changes with age, that is, people 
between 40 and 45 years have more propensity to be employed in the formal 
sector.  
Few studies have addressed individual earnings from an intergenerational 
approach. One of the first papers is by Valero and Tijerina (2003), they 
estimates a Mincer equation for sons controlling by parentʑs characteristics and 
parentʑs wages. They found the sons of parentʑs employer and parentʑs self-
employer have higher wages than sons whose parents were employed. This may 
be caused due to the transmission of skills and training.  
In regard to intergenerational transmission of occupational in Mexico, Castillo 
and Vela (2013) use a probit model to estimate the probability that children 
keep the same occupational position that their parents. They results indicate 
that the social-domestic context have an influence in the labor decisions. Hence, 
self-employed parents transmit informal human capital to their offspring. 
However, this results could be affected because it does not correct for self-
selection bias in the employment decision and heterogeneity in the sample.  
 
  
38 
2.3 Empirical strategy   
2.3.1 Identification  
A key issue in examining pay determination is worker preferences. In a narrow 
sense, we might be interested in why a worker chooses to work in a particular 
sector. The model is based on a binary representation of the employment status 
decisions. Assume that there are two employment options available to each 
individual: (1) informal sector or (2) a formal sector. Several important features 
should be considered. First, informal sector regime is associated with more 
flexibility and independence, usually, formal sector implies greater responsibility 
and full-time job. Second, each sector has different working conditions and 
different market institutions. 
Similar to Rees and Shan (1986) we assume that employment status and 
earnings are determined simultaneously. This requires a 3SLS estimation process. 
In the first stage, we estimate a reduced form probit model of sector occupation 
decision. This is used to construct a sample selection correction term. In the 
second stage, we estimate an OLS standard Mincer equation to obtain an 
earnings function. This is used to compare the differences in earnings between 
both occupational sectors, and correct the bias in sample selection. And finally, 
in the third stage, the differences in earnings are used to estimate a probit model 
of the decision to be employed in the formal or informal occupation sector. 8  
Following Lee (1982) self-selection correction, we assume a linear utility 
function, 
informalU  and formalU that represents the utility derived by individual i 
from states of occupation.  
)0)log(logPr()0Pr( formalinformalformalinformal
*  iii ōXŋYYŊŉUUI   (1) 
Equation (1) can be estimated as a probit model. However, earnings are only 
observed in one of the two states, so Lee (1982) two-stage procedure must be 
used to construct predicted earning for each individual.  
                                    
8 The self–selection problem has been analyzed in different context. For example, Lee (1978) 
investigates the joint determination of the extent of unionism and the effect of unions on wage 
rates. Adamchik and Bedi, (1983) examine whether there are any differential of workers in the 
public and private sector, and others.  
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Hence, we define an indicator variable )( *iI  as follow, )1(
* iI  if 
0formalinformal UU  and 0 otherwise. Thus that represents the individuals i’s 
marginal propensity to choice occupation sector. 
Individual i decides employed in the informal sector if 0* iI   (2) 
Individual i decides employed in the formal sector if 0* iI   (3) 
We estimate Mincerʑs (1974) semi logarithmic wage function for the informal 
workers )ln( informalY  and formal workers )ln( formalY . Background characteristics, 
notably occupational and sectoral choices of parents, are often used as a method 
of identifying sectoral choices made by workers Dustmann and Van Soest (1998) 
so that pay premia or penalties to working in a particular sector can be 
conditioned on the potentially self–selected characteristics of the workers 
(Koumenta, 2011 p. 227) 
informaliinformalinformalinformal eZŌŉY )ln(      (4) 
formaliformalformalformal eZŌŉY )ln(      (5) 
Where )( iZ  are covariate vectors, )(Ō are coefficient vectors, and (e) are the error 
terms  2,0 informalσN  and  2,0 formalσN  respectively. The model is identified by the 
exclusion from )( iZ  of elements of )( iX . Equation (1) can then be estimated 
using the standard maximum likelihood procedure. However, estimating the 
income equations (4) and (5) by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) might be 
inappropriate because it fails to reflect the possibility of self-selection in the 
decision to choose an occupation sector. For example, informal occupation 
workers might have some unobserved characteristics that affect their income 
generating capabilities. 
To deal with possible self-selection bias, Lee (1982) methodology recommends 
substituting income equations (4) and (5) into (1) and obtain the reduced form 
of the sector occupation decision equation.  
*
210
*
iiii ōZŊXŊŊI         (6) 
Assuming the error term )( *iō  is normally distributed with unit variance, 
Equation (6) can be estimated by a maximum likelihood probit and the fitted 
values for the decision employment occupation probabilities. Hence, )ˆ( iψ  are 
used to calculate the selectivity correction variables or inverse Millʑs ratios as 
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follow:  )ˆ(/)ˆ( iii ψFψf1H   and  )ˆ(1/)ˆ( iii ψFψf0H  , where )ˆ( iψF  is the 
standard cumulative distribution function and )ˆ( iψf  is the standard normal 
density function. Thus, )( i1H  and )( i0H  measure the truncation effect associated 
with sample selectivity (see, for more details (Lee, 1982)).  
As a result, the two income equation (4) and (5) are modified to incorporate the 
inverse Millʑs ratio as follows:  
informal
*
informaliinformalinformalinformal ησZŌŉY  H1)ln(     (7) 
formal
*
formalformalformalformal H0)ln( ησZŌŉY i      (8) 
Thus, )( *informalσ  and )( *formalσ  corrects for selectivity bias in the observations, the 
selectivity bias can be positive or negative. It can consider four different cases. 
For example, if )0( *informalσ  and )0( *formal σ , the implication is that each group 
has a comparative advantage in its chosen employment status. Typically it 
occurs when *informalσ  is very large relative to *formalσ . Hence, individual with higher 
skills enter professions with the greater variance in earnings, see, for more details 
Madala, (1983). 
Finally, OLS predicted values of earnings for individuals i in both informal 
)ln( informalY  and formal )ln( informalY  occupation of (7) and (8) are substituted in the 
structural form of the employment sector decision, Equation (1), to obtain 
consistent parameter estimates.9 
 
 
  
                                    
9 The model presented above is referred to as an endogenous switching regression model. It is 
used to address issues of self selection and the estimation of treatment effects when there is no 
random allocation of subjects to treatment and control groups as is generally the case with 
observational (as opposed to experimental) data. 
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2.4 Dataset and results   
2.4.1 Informal employment definition   
Measuring the size of the informal economy and the incidence of informal 
employment has proved to be difficult. Also, different definitions are put forward 
to perform the concept operational. The appropriate methodology for the 
statistical measurement of informal employment depends on the usersʑ 
requirements, measurement objectives, and the organization of the national 
system information.  
There have been several definitions of the dividing line between the formal and 
informal employment. For statistical proposes, The International Labor 
Organization (ILO) in The Fifteen International Conference of Labor 
Statistician Characterized (15th ICLS resolution) set up a definition according to 
the following criteria: ʔencompasses persons in employment who, by law or in 
practice, are not subject to national labor legislation and income tax or entitled 
to social protection and employment benefitsʕ ILO, 2013:4)10 
Following the methodology recommended by the ILO, in Mexico informal 
employment is defined as ʔemployees without access to public or private healthʕ. 
This criterion is especially useful in countries where the registration of workers 
entails the registration of the enterprises employing them with the social security 
(most notably through the social security agencies, IMSS, ISSSTE, etcetera). 
Although the employment relationships of workers in informal employment are 
heterogeneous, they share a basic vulnerability. Namely, they need to be self–
supporting and to rely on informal arrangements. 11 
  
                                    
10 For more details see, ʔResolution concerning statistics of employment in the informal sector”, 
adopted by the Fifteenth International Conference of Labor Statisticians (15th ICLS resolution). 
11 The ILO and international reached a consensus with respect to the concept in two dimensions. 
First, the type of nature of the economic unit, in other words, if the unit dedicated to the 
production of goods or services operates using household resources and does not keep basic 
accounts records. Second, refers to all employment that is not subject to labor law or an 
institutional framework, regardless of whether the economic units employing the workers are 
unregistered enterprises or formal enterprises. 
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2.4.2 The data  
The dataset used for the empirical analysis is the 2011 EMOVI (Social Mobility 
Survey in Mexico, EMOVI, for its acronym in Spanish). It is a nationally 
representative household survey which was conducted in 2006 and 2011.12 
EMOVI is retrospective socioeconomic data that collects current respondentsʑ 
information and the comparable retrospective data on their parentʑs occupation, 
and household conditions when intervieweeʑs was 14 years old. We use the data 
from the second wave in 2011, which includes almost 11,001 individuals between 
25 to 64 years old (both household heads and non-household heads). This survey 
track the socioeconomic variables of a given household, each household member 
is asked detailed questions about age, gender, marital status, educational level, 
labor market participation, working hours, employment status, as well as 
household size and other features. 
2.4.3 Sample and descriptive statistics  
Since our goal is to study the interaction between son and parentsʑ occupation, 
we define our estimation sample according to the following criteria. Informal 
work regime is identified by the question. As part of this job do you receive 
health care benefits? This question is consistent with ILO recommendation and 
it is applicable for sons and their parents. 
We exclude unemployment workers, pensioners, students, as well as people with 
a disability. We restrict to full-time workers –defined for our purpose as those 
who only have one job and work 30 or more hours per week– who provide 
information on their earnings and occupation. In the case of earnings, we exclude 
observations with values smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than the 99th 
percentile. This cutoff point is of course arbitrary, but it is frequently used in 
related studies. 
Also, we exclude the female population for the subsequent reasons. First, full-
time workers are predominantly a male labor participation. Second, the quite 
restrictive selection is made to prevent the results from being affected by sample 
selection bias, that occurs if unobservable characteristics, which affect the work 
                                    
12 This survey is designed by the Espinosa Rugarcia Foundation and the Center for Studies 
Espinosa Yglesias (CEEY). 
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decision, are correlated with characteristics that affect the process determining 
to work. These restrictions are justified by the aim to form a relatively 
homogeneous sample of employment occupations and wages. The final sample 
consists of 2,633 individuals where earnings and transitions into employment 
status can be observed. Table A1 contains summary statistics of the sample, it 
includes the maximum, minimum, mean and standard deviation of each variable.  
As a starting point, Table 1 reports intergenerational mobility regime. Each 
row of the table shows the occupation of the father while columns indicate the 
occupation category of the sons. If we consider the column percentages instead 
(that is, the share of each class from each background category); among, 75 
percent and 40 percent were immobile (their occupations was the same category 
as their fatherʑs) into informal and formal occupation, respectively. Also, a 
significant percentage of sons moving into the informal sector, about 60 percent, 
while a small percentage shifts to the formal sector, about 25 percent. Overall, 
prevalence is observed towards informality. 
Table 1. Intergenerational mobility between occupation    
Fatherʑs 
occupation 
Sonʑs occupation 
Total 
Formal Informal  
Formal  380 577 957 
 
40% 60% 100% 
Informal 416 1,260 1,676 
 
25% 75% 100% 
Total  796 1,837 2,633 
  30% 70% 100% 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI 
From Table 2, it can be seen that there is a significant difference between 
individuals working on the informal and formal sector in most respects. The 
implication of this is that, simply looking at differences in earnings cannot 
identify the informality wage penalty, but rather regression analysis is required 
to find the ceteris paribus effect of occupation sector upon earnings.  
  
44 
As for other features, individuals educational level is measured by dummy 
variables that assume the value of one if the individuals have concluded. 
Significant differences were observed in the levels of schooling. Informal workers 
observed a lower level of schooling. Regarding the intergenerational factor it is 
observed that informal workers had parents with lower levels of schooling.13 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics by employment status 
Variable  
All informal 
(Obs=1,837) 
All formal 
(Obs=796) 
M ean 
Diff 
Mean  SD Mean SD 
Log hourly wage 2.754 0.691 3.192 0.611 -0.438*** 
Age 37.458 11.675 35.734 9.775 1.725*** 
Experience  23.112 13.475 19.09 11.096 4.022*** 
Less than primary 0.157 0.364 0.054 0.226 0.103*** 
Primary completed 0.241 0.428 0.146 0.353 0.095*** 
Secondary completed 0.560 0.497 0.644 0.479 -0.085*** 
University completed 0.043 0.203 0.156 0.363 -0.113*** 
Father's completed years schooling  3.507 3.91 5.185 4.411 -1.678*** 
Motherʑs completed years schooling  3.475 3.784 5.018 4.075 -1.543*** 
* p < 0.1, ** <0.05, ***p<0.01   
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on  2011 EMOVI 
  
                                    
13 The Mexican education system is characterized by 6 years of primary education, followed by 6 
years of secondary education. Secondary education is divided in 3 years of lower secondary 
education (secundaria) and 3 years of upper secondary education (preparatoria). Hence, Less 
than primary (less than 6 years), Primary completed (6 years of schooling) Secondary completed 
(less than 15 years completed) Colleague (more than 16 years completed). 
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2.4.4 Correction for se lf–se lection   
The first step is to compute the selection corrected wages. Regression include 
full–time male workers between 25 and 64 years of age. To compute the ʐinverse 
Millʑs ratiosʑ of selectivity correction variables, the reduced form of the regimen 
employment decision equation (6) includes as independent variables: experience, 
experience squared, marital status, number of children, fatherʑs employment 
regime, locality size, and seven dummies for region. The estimated coefficients of 
are reported in Table A2.  
Subsequently, with the fitted values of equation (7) at hand, we compute both 
inverse Millʑs ratios  )ˆ(/)ˆ(1 iii ψFψfH   and  )ˆ(1/)ˆ(0 iii ψFψfH   for all 
individuals. Then we use the standard ʔlog levelʕ Mincer equation to wages 
estimation, this involves regressing the natural log of the hourly wage upon 
levels of independent variables. The informal workers regime equation (7) and 
formal workers regime equation (8) also includes the correction selection variable 
or inverse Mills ratio, H1 and H0, respectively.14 
In order to observe differences, the exercise is performed for the entire sample 
and for two groups of workers according to their skill level. Estimated 
coefficients are displayed in Table 4. The coefficient in the wage equation 
reports the estimate for selectivity correction term in equations (7) and (8). In 
both cases it is statistically significant. It can be shown that there is both a 
positive selection into informal and formal regime occupation. That is, those who 
choose informal regime are better than average of informal workers and those 
who choose formal are better than average of formal workers.  
  
                                    
14 The reduced–form equation contain the selectivity variables which were estimated rather than 
observed. It is well know that although OLS produces consistent estimates of the parameters this 
is not true for the standard error. Then, we use the correction to the variance covariance matrix 
following Lee (1978) procedure.  
46 
The finding of positive selection bias for both workers is consistent with the 
hypothesis that those who have chosen the employee status posses comparative 
advantage at it.15 
Note that the positive selection remains for both skill levels for informal workers, 
while for formal workers positive selection only remains for those with high skill 
level. Thus, earnings of formal workers with low skill level are not significantly 
different from what their earnings would have been had they chose to be 
informal workers.  
 
  
                                    
15 A tighter interpretation is as follows. Consider the subsample of formal and informal workers 
with the same measured characteristics. Then the earnings distribution actually observed for 
formal is higher than the distribution that would be observed for the average individual in the 
subsample had he chosen to be informal (Rees and Shan, 1986 p. 102). In other words, the 
average earnings of individual with given measured characteristics who have chosen to be formal 
is greater than what formal earnings would be for those with the same measured characteristics 
who chose informal. See Graph A1. Wage distribution by occupation status.  
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Table 4. Wage equations corrected by self-selectivity   
 Informal workers Formal workers  
Variable  All 
workers  
Low 
skill  
level  
High 
skill 
level 
All 
workers  
Low 
skill  
level  
High 
skill 
level 
Experience 0.016** 0.017* 0.007 0.003 -0.012 0.011 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) 
Experience squared -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1 if married  0.056 0.037 0.140* 0.072 0.083 0.073 
 (0.035) (0.041) (0.068) (0.050) (0.066) (0.072) 
Has a sons 0.074* 0.072 0.097 0.035 -0.038 0.071 
 (0.037) (0.044) (0.067) (0.052) (0.070) (0.074) 
H1    -1.278*** -1.006*** -1.834***    
 (0.102) (0.223) (0.189)    
     1.623*** 0.356 2.754*** 
    (0.135) (0.290) (0.281) 
Constant 2.114*** 2.323*** 1.657*** 3.563*** 3.327*** 3.675*** 
 (0.098) (0.148) (0.182) (0.083) (0.191) (0.116) 
Demographic charts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Family of origin charcs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Locality size  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for region  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,837 1,313 524 796 388 408 
R2 0.167 0.124 0.203 0.177 0.041 0.239 
Controls: Demographic characteristics: age, age squared, schooling, schooling squared. Family 
of origin characteristics: number of siblings, one-parent family. Locality size: Rural. Dummies for 
region: North, Center North, Center, Capital, Gulf, South and Pacific.  
Low skill level: Workers with less than 9 years schooling completed (secundaria or less). 
High skill level: Worker with more than 9 years schooling completed (more than secundaria) 
Notes. Standard error in parentheses 
*: p < 0.10, **: <0.05, ***: p<0.01 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI 
In addition, Table 5 reports the corrected predicted wage by schooling level and 
age. That is, the wage for workers according to employment status, and the 
wage they would get if they worked in a different regime of their status. 
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Hence, working in the informal sector, formal workers receive higher wages than 
informal, but, this gap is statistically significant except for the university 
complete level. On the other hand, working in the formal sector, formal workers 
also receive higher wages. Another significant result are the ware returns for 
each sector. We observe that age have no linear effect to informal workers, 
increasing relatively slowly at first, and then decreasing later about 35 years. 
This effect is opposite to the formal sector where a slowly increasing effect is 
observed.  
Table 5. Predicted wage corrected by employment status  
Characteristics  
W orking on informal sector  W orking on formal sector  
To 
informal 
workers 
To 
formal 
workers  
Mean Diff 
To 
informal 
workers 
To 
formal 
workers  
Mean Diff 
Less than primary 2.448 2.537 -0.089*** 2.796 2.785 0.011 
Primary complete 2.643 2.743 -0.100*** 2.905 2.945 -0.040** 
Secondary complete 2.845 2.954  -0.109*** 3.116 3.192 -0.076*** 
University complete 3.298 3.361 -0.063 3.538 3.564 -0.026 
Age    =   25 years 2.752 2.915 -0.162*** 2.986 3.147 -0.161*** 
30 years 2.777 2.945 -0.168*** 3.003 3.147 -0.144*** 
35 years 2.837 2.957 -0.120** 3.049 3.190 -0.141*** 
40 years 2.773 3.058 -0.285*** 3.031 3.238 -0.207*** 
More than 45 years 2.678 2.982 -0.304*** 3.098 3.296 -0.198*** 
*: p < 0.10, **: <0.05, ***: p<0.01 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI 
On average, if those formal workers were allocated to the informal wage regimen, 
they would have higher wages than those who in fact are informal workers. 
Intuitively, that is consistent with an informal workers enjoying a significant 
comparative earnings advantage over a formal workers regime, given a particular 
set of other observer characteristics. Hence, those who choose to be informal 
employment have upper endowments of desirable employment characteristics 
(can be thought of as ability) than those workers who choose formal regime.   
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2.4.5 The structural probit equation   
Finally, using the corrected estimated coefficients of the two wage equations, we 
compute earnings difference for each individual between informal and formal 
sector. This is then included in the structural probit to obtain consistent 
parameters, equation (1). Similar to wage equation correction. We compute for 
the entire sample and for two groups of workers according to their skill level. 
Results by skill level are presented in the Appendix. Table A3 for low skill 
level, and Table A4 for high skill level.   
The estimated for entire sample are reported in Table 6, we show the marginal 
effects at means of the probability to choose informal work regimen, as we 
describe in equation (1). Robust standard error are reported in parentheses 
The coefficient that related wage differentials is positive and strongly significant 
coefficient in the models presented, even when family background characteristics 
are included as controls. That is, due to the difference between wage in the 
informal and formal sectors the more likely an individual is to decide working in 
the informal sector. Hence, a one per cent increase in the ratio of the predicted 
formal wage raises the probability that an individual working in the informal 
sector about 0.32 percent points. Although there is very little difference between 
the average wage of the informal and the wage of formal workers, informal 
workers have inferior human capital characteristics.  
The role of education is relevant, that is, it has a direct effect on the wages of 
workers, however, we found that the probability of working in the informal 
sector decrease, as schooling improvement. Schooling therefore could embody 
two aspects of human capital, one is to increase the labor productivity and the 
other is to reduce the wages variance due to homogenize the skill of workers, 
mainly for university completed level. Coefficient of marital status, confirm that 
being married reduce the probability to be informal, that is due to the benefits 
that social security offers to their family.  
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Regarding to retrospective data on their parentʑs when intervieweeʑs was 14 
years old. We include parentʑs occupation, indigenous condition, schooling, 
preference that son's study, number of siblings, and household size. 16 
As we expected, having a fatherʑs with informal work is shown to have positive 
effect on the probability to choose informal employment. This coefficient is 
statistically significant in overall models. Motherʑs coefficient is not significant 
mainly because of low labor participation of women in Mexico in those years. 
Also, we found that parentʑs education also reduces the likelihood of employed 
in the informal sector. In relation to parents' indigenous conditions, we found a 
positive effect on both parents. These results support the high correlation 
between indigenous conditions and low education attainment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    
16 One important variable is the position of the interviewee between the brothers, however, this 
variable is not available in the survey. 
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Table 6. Structural probit equation to all sample  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE 
Log hourly difference 0.0374*** (-5.637) 0.0313*** (-4.633) 0.0322*** (-4.813) 0.0302*** (-4.472) 
Age -0.0137 (-1.838) -0.0174* (-2.316) -0.0172* (-2.291) -0.0186* (-2.470) 
Age squared 0.000152 (1.669) 0.0001* (2.096) 0.0001* (2.056) 0.0002* (2.243) 
Less than primary  0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 
Primary completed -0.0637* (-2.484) -0.0452 (-1.583) -0.0510 (-1.819) -0.0403 (-1.389) 
Secondary completed -0.199*** (-8.328) -0.154*** (-5.626) -0.163*** (-6.104) -0.147*** (-5.252) 
University completed -0.460*** (-11.40) -0.368*** (-8.091) -0.397*** (-8.931) -0.360*** (-7.808) 
1 if married -0.0666** (-3.027) -0.0672** (-3.042) -0.0635** (-2.880) -0.0662** (-2.996) 
1 if has a sons 0.0339 (1.465) 0.0376 (1.611) 0.0293 (1.256) 0.0352 (1.504) 
1 if father's with informal work   0.136*** (7.007)   0.138*** (7.040) 
Father's years of schooling   -0.008*** (-3.494)   -0.00428 (-1.310) 
1 if father's preference to study   -0.065*** (-3.304)   -0.0653** (-3.255) 
1 if father's indigenous   0.0703* (2.569)   -0.0174 (-0.370) 
1 if mother's with informal work     0.0563 (1.537) 0.0323 (0.871) 
Mother's years of schooling     -0.0117*** (-4.448) -0.00625 (-1.774) 
1 if mother's preference to study     -0.0146 (-0.425) 0.0183 (0.520) 
1 if mother's indigenous     0.103*** (3.690) 0.109* (2.243) 
Family origin characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Locality size Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Dummies for region Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 2633  2633  2633  2633  
Log lik. -1,500.8  -1,457.2  -1,479.9  -1,452.2  
McFadden's R2 0.0699  0.0969  0.0828  0.1000  
Count R 71.48%  72.24%  72.01%  72.92%  
Log hourly difference = 
formalinformal YY ˆlnˆln  .  
Controls: Family of origin characteristics: number of siblings, household size. Locality size: Rural.  Dummies for region: North, Center North, 
Center, Capital, Gulf, South and Pacific. Marginal effects; robust standard error in parentheses; discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
*: p < 0.10, **: <0.05, ***: p<0.01 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI 
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2.5 Conclusions   
This paper motivates the use of a retrospective data EMOVI 2011. Unlike 
previous studies in Mexico, this survey provides data about family background 
to understand the relationship between intergenerational occupation status. The 
contributions of this paper, by focusing on retrospective data, set up a 
microeconometric framework with expected wages explicitly determining labor 
occupation decisions, and controlling as much as possible for heterogeneity 
sample.  
The empirical results highlight the following aspects. The finding of positive 
selection bias for both workers groups is consistent with the hypothesis that 
those who have chosen the employee status posses comparative advantage at it. 
Also, significant coefficients show that not correct for self–selection bias might 
cause wrong results if ignored. That is, structural model of the selection decision 
show that wage differential between informal and formal workers has a strong 
and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of choosing informal work. 
Due to the difference between wage in the informal and formal sectors the more 
likely an individual is to decide working in the informal sector.  
An important finding of this research is the intergenerational transmission of 
informal work status between sons and parents. This strong probability to 
choose the same informality fatherʑs occupation could be explained by the 
existence of comparative advantages for those children whose parents were 
employed in the informal sector, and also wage differences between the two 
sectors. Hence, individuals with informal parentʑs occupation have less likelihood 
to be enrolled in the formal sector. 
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2.7 Appendix    
Table A1. Descriptive statistics   
Variable M in M ax M ean Std. Dev.  N  
1 if informal occupation  0 1 0.69 0.46 2,633 
Hourly earnings (log) 0.22 5.85 2.89 0.7 2,633 
Age 25 64 36.94 11.16 2,633 
Age square 625 4096 1488.86 934.51 2,633 
Experience  1 58 21.9 12.93 2,633 
Experience squared 1 3364 646.65 730.26 2,633 
Completed years schooling  0 26 9.04 4 2,633 
1 if live with couple 0 1 0.64 0.48 2,633 
1 if have sons 0 1 0.61 0.49 2,633 
Number of sons 0 13 1.36 1.54 2,633 
1 if father's with informal occupation 0 1 0.64 0.48 2,633 
Father's completed years schooling  0 23 4.01 4.14 2,633 
1 if father's indigenous spoken  0 1 0.16 0.37 2,633 
1 if father's preference to study 0 1 0.5 0.5 2,633 
1 if mother's with informal occupation 0 1 0.11 0.32 2,633 
Motherʑs completed years schooling  0 22 3.94 3.94 2,633 
1 if father's indigenous spoken  0 1 0.15 0.36 2,633 
1 if father's preference to study 0 1 0.13 0.33 2,633 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI 
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Table A2. Employment regimen decision   
Variable   dy/dx SE 
Years of schooling -0.0097*** (-1.261) 
Schooling squared -0.0009*** (-2.565) 
Household size -0.0125*** (-2.609) 
1 if living in couple -0.0273* (-1.054) 
Has a sons -0.0082 (-0.316) 
Father with informal employment 0.1090*** (5.778) 
Father's years of schooling -0.0049*** (-1.546) 
Mother's years of schooling -0.0018*** (-0.537) 
1 if rural locality (less than 2,500 hab) 0.0682** (2.965) 
Family of origin characteristics Yes  
Dummies for region Yes  
Observations 2,633  
Log lik. -1438.2  
McFadden's R2 0.109  
Count R 72.35%  
Controls: Dummies for region: North, Center North, Center, Capital, Gulf, South and Pacific.  
Marginal effects; standard error in parentheses; discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.  
*: p < 0.10, **: <0.05, ***: p<0.01 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI 
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Table A3. Structural probit equation to low skill level workers   
 Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  
 dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE 
Log hourly difference 0.0467*** (5.867) 0.0392*** (4.822) 0.0414*** (5.104) 0.0382*** (4.700) 
Age -0.00614 (-0.774) -0.0100 (-1.256) -0.0109 (-1.359) -0.0120 (-1.499) 
Age squared 0.0000395 (0.411) 0.0000859 (0.888) 0.0000909 (0.938) 0.000108 (1.110) 
Years of schooling -0.0229*** (-5.240) -0.0157*** (-3.433) -0.0169*** (-3.708) -0.0144** (-3.142) 
Married -0.0625** (-2.582) -0.0667** (-2.765) -0.0609* (-2.515) -0.0663** (-2.744) 
Has a sons 0.0234 (0.888) 0.0329 (1.252) 0.0282 (1.070) 0.0351 (1.334) 
1 if father's with informal occup   0.128*** (5.896)   0.127*** (5.794) 
Father's years of schooling   -0.00979** (-2.973)   -0.00598 (-1.369) 
1 if father's preference to study   -0.0647** (-2.985)   -0.0634** (-2.879) 
1 if father's indigenous   0.0480 (1.673)   -0.0310 (-0.630) 
1 if mother's with informal occup     0.0345 (0.832) 0.0222 (0.529) 
Mother's years of schooling     -0.0123*** (-3.667) -0.00586 (-1.312) 
1 if mother's preference to study     -0.0490 (-1.201) -0.0270 (-0.650) 
1 if mother's indigenous     0.0755* (2.555) 0.0945 (1.871) 
Family origin characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Locality size Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Dummies for region Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1,701  1,701  1,701  1,701  
Log lik. -871.9  -843.1  -859.1  -840.1  
McFadden's R2 0.0455  0.0770  0.0595  0.0802  
Count R 77.19%  77.48%  77.72%  77.60%  
Log hourly difference = 
formalinformal YY ˆlnˆln   
Controls: Family of origin characteristics: Number of siblings, one-parent family. Locality size: Rural.  Dummies for region: North, 
Center North, Center, Capital, Gulf, South and Pacific. Marginal effects; robust standard error in parentheses; discrete change dummy 
variable from 0 to 1 
*: p < 0.10, **: <0.05, ***: p<0.01 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI  
60 
Table A2. Structural probit equation to high skill level workers   
 Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  
 dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE 
Log hourly difference 0.0398*** (4.516) 0.0338*** (3.774) 0.0350*** (3.932) 0.0330*** (3.678) 
Age -0.0267* (-2.487) -0.0287** (-2.665) -0.0271* (-2.516) -0.0290** (-2.689) 
Age squared 0.000311* (2.315) 0.000330* (2.455) 0.000310* (2.304) 0.000333* (2.478) 
Years of schooling -0.0374*** (-8.390) -0.0311*** (-6.604) -0.0337*** (-7.296) -0.0309*** (-6.523) 
1 if married -0.0766** (-2.603) -0.0804** (-2.715) -0.0752* (-2.547) -0.0804** (-2.708) 
1 if has a sons 0.0525 (1.730) 0.0599 (1.955) 0.0503 (1.646) 0.0576 (1.872) 
1 if father's with informal work   0.153*** (6.086)   0.156*** (6.117) 
Father's years of schooling   -0.00626* (-2.062)   -0.00381 (-0.957) 
1 if father's preference to study   -0.0686** (-2.675)   -0.0706** (-2.705) 
1 if father's indigenous   0.0747* (1.972)   -0.0236 (-0.368) 
1 if mother's with informal work     0.0142 (0.307) -0.0206 (-0.435) 
Mother's years of schooling     -0.00878** (-2.704) -0.00383 (-0.890) 
1 if mother's preference to study     -0.0144 (-0.341) 0.0268 (0.617) 
1 if mother's indigenous     0.111** (2.862) 0.122 (1.855) 
Family origin characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Locality size Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Dummies for region Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1,744  1,744  1,744  1,744  
Log lik. -1084.5  -1056.5  -1074.8  -1054.3  
McFadden's R2 0.0526  0.0771  0.0611  0.0790  
Count R 65.65%  67.49%  65.88%  67.60%  
Log hourly difference = 
formalinformal YY ˆlnˆln   
Controls: Family of origin characteristics: Number of siblings, one-parent family. Locality size: Rural.  Dummies for region: North, 
Center North, Center, Capital, Gulf, South and Pacific. Marginal effects; robust standard error in parentheses; discrete change dummy 
variable from 0 to 1 
*: p < 0.10, **: <0.05, ***: p<0.01 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI 
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Chapter 3. Leaving the nest or living with her 
parents: Evidence from M exican 
m illennia ʑs generation 
Leaving the nest or living with her parents: 
Evidence from Mexican millenniaʑs generation  
3.1 Introduction 
In Mexico, 2010 census enumerated that 67 percent young adults aged 20 to 29 
years still living with their parents, 29 percent living with a partner and about 4 
percent living alone. Why young adults co-residence with her parents beyond 
mature age has several issue. By way of illustration, implication of the delay in 
independence is related to the delay in cohabitation, marriage and fertility with 
negative effect of birth rate; also, it has important implications on the economic 
independence of adultʑs children in the labor market Chiuri and Del Boca (2008).  
Living with parentʑs serves as an important mechanism through with parents 
transfer resources to their adultʑs sons. Usually, these resources are fundamental in 
enabling young people to complete their education, or establish families of their 
own Cobb-Clark (2008). Also, living with parents might affect the decision to enter 
the labor market, consisting with this hypothesis, Chiuri and Del Boca (2008) 
found that children living in household where both parents are working may 
experience low unemployment rates, whereas those living in household where the 
mother is not working, or she is just a discourage seeker, will be experience high 
unemployment rates.  
In addition, Becker et al., (2008) test whether co–residence is associated with 
higher job insecurity, in other words, young adults when facing income risk are 
more likely to postpone irreversible choices, such as household formation and 
decision to enter the labor market  
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Given the background, millenniaʑs generation is especially interesting. As an 
illustration, 2010 U.S. Census data shows that Millenniaʑs are significantly worse 
off economically than either Gen Xers of Baby Boomers at a similar stage of life. 
Their poverty rate is nearly double than other generations, more live with their 
parents, and the home ownership rate is nearly 10 percent lower than other groups 
(APA, 2014 p. 7) –unfortunately, in Mexico there are no studies comparing 
economic performance across generations–.17  
The case of Mexico presents some considerations. According to 2015 Mexican 
Intercensal Survey, Millenniaʑs Generation (individuals aged 15 to 35 years) 
represents the main generation in Mexico, comprising roughly 35% of the total 
population. This generation presents some relevant socio economic characteristicsʑ, 
for example, millenniaʑs have more educational outcomes than previous 
generations, and however, it is also a generation that may have affected their 
economic performance due to episodes of economic crisis.18 
This paper adds to the literature by examining the determinants of childrenʑs 
propensity to live with their parents. First, analysis focuses on the educational 
achievement of children, from this perspective, parents are helping to finance their 
sons and daughtersʑ investment in human capital by providing them with shelter, 
and possibly other goods and services, while co residing. Second, we have specific 
interest other individual characteristics such as gender differences, marital status, 
and siblingsʑ. Third, we incorporate retrospective information about household 
conditions and parentʑs characteristics such as, schooling and labor participation 
when the interviewee was 14 year old.  
                                    
17 Generational cohorts are just one way to categorize a group of people with similarities. 
Following Eddy and McGinnis (2015) cohorts for generations are as follow:  Baby boom 
(1946–1965); Generation X (1965–1979); Millenniaʑs Generation (1980–1999); Generation Z 
(2000–today). 
18 For example, 1995 pesos crisis had differential impacts on income and consumption 
across groups, more highly educated heads and those living in metropolitan areas 
experienced much larger declines in income than unschooled heads and rural household. 
Income per capita is estimated to have fallen by 17 per cent in agriculture, compared to 35 
per cent in constructions and in comer, and 48 per cent in financial services (Pereznieto, 
2010 p. 15). Similarly, income per capita of rural laborers fell by less than of non–
agricultural workers McKenzie (2003). 
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In this paper, we take advantage of the rich micro data sets available for Mexico. 
2011 EMOVI (Social Mobility Survey in Mexico, EMOVI for its acronym in 
Spanish) contains nationally representative sample of individual aged 25 to 64 
years, ant its retrospective information that allows to connect comparable data 
from parentʑs, when the intervieweeʑs was 14 years old. In other words, out data 
provide information for both cohabiting and non cohabiting children.19 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 
describes a theoretical model of living arrangements between sons and their 
parents. Section 4 describes the data and presents summary statistics. Section 5 
outlines the econometric methodology and results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
  
                                    
19
 This survey is designed by the Espinosa Rugarcia Foundation and the Center for Studies 
Espinosa Yglesias (CEEY). 
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3.2 Literature review 
Multi–generational household (MGH henceforth) is a family unit where the head of 
household lives with their sons or daughter and their grandchildren or when the 
householder is living with their child and their parent or parent-in-law. A MGH 
includes at least two adult generations (for example, parents and adult children 
ages 25 or older were either generation can be the household head) or two non-
sequential generations (for example, grandparents and grandchildren of any age).20 
Leaving the parental home is a fundamental demographic transition related to 
other demographic transitions including partnering and parenting. In recent 
decades, co residence and the age of leaving home have increased, mainly due to 
the weak labor market, escalating housing costs and increased educational 
opportunities Cobb-Clark (2008).21 
Co residence allows young adults to consume, save and keep certain benefits that 
perhaps living away from home they could not have, even with parental financial 
transfers. Co residence allows parents to transfer resources to their adult children 
and enable them to complete their education, enter the labour market, and 
establish families of their own (Cobb-Clark 2008, p. 3). Also, co residence might be 
considered a form of non-employment insurance Becker et al., (2005), McElroy 
(1985). 
Parentʑs income level and its influence on leaving home are a well-studied variable, 
and its effects are diverse. For example, high parental income could either support 
the setting up of adult childrenʑs own household. In the case of parental transfers, 
they may be at least as important as public transfers in supporting young adults 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, (1993).  
                                    
20 Historically, Ruggles, (2003) suggest that the decline of the multigenerational family in 
the twentieth century is connected to the labor market and the diminishing importance of 
agricultural and occupational inheritance. Usually, elderly farmer needed an adult child or 
child–in–law to do heavy work when they were no longer capable of doing it themselves.  
21 In the Western world, after the Great Depression and World War II, and up to the 
1970s, more people experienced independence living before marriage, though in certain 
countries leaving home remained closely tied to it DaVanzo and Goldscheier (1990). 
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There are several channels that influence leaving home decision. For example, most 
countries with weak welfare state evidence more dependence of adult children from 
their parents, Aasve et al., (2002). In this context, youthʑs actual or expected 
employment status and labor income are determining factors in the decision to 
leave or stay in the parental home Ermisch (1999).22 
Conversely, countries with more generous welfare states –high public support for 
youth–, there seems to be little effect of employment and earnings in the decision 
to leave home. Results are questionable due to the fact that most young people 
leave too early, mainly to continue their education, sheltered by public resources. 
Aasve et al., (2002), 
In addition, labor, housing, education and income-support policies are relevant in 
the decision to leave home Cobb-Clark (2008). Countries with high enrolment 
ratios in higher education explain the early departure from the parental home 
Ermisch (1986).  
Based on socio demographic approach, family composition and other characteristics 
as gender, religion and ethnicity are determinants in living arrangements. Co 
residence is an important mechanism through which different generations transfer 
resources between them. In most developed countries, resources predominantly flow 
from parents to their adult children. However, there are cultures where resources 
and support are bidirectional. This is common in countries such as Spain and Italy 
Cobb-Clark (2008). Also, co–residence serves as an insurance mechanism against 
entry into poverty. Recent papers examine the interactions between leaving home 
and entry into poverty, that is, how far poverty entry is the result of leaving home, 
rather than arising from heterogeneity or selection Aasve, et al (2002).23  
  
                                    
22 However, current income does not necessarily predict potential earnings. Researchers 
typically model the relationship between predicted wages and living arrangements (Cobb-
Clark, 2008 p. 17). 
23 Also, there are studies related to the wellbeing and feelings of parents while they live 
with their adult children and reports on higher marital satisfaction after children have left 
the nest Aquilino and Supple (1991). 
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3.3 Theoretical model  
Models of co-residence with parents involve a theoretical framework in which the 
sons compare their utility living with parents and their expected utilities outside 
the home. However, in case of co residence parents and children share income, as 
well as housing and domestic goods. Thus their final optimal choice would also 
depend on respectively parents and children utility levels in the outside option, i.e., 
the case of separate living arrangements Chiuri and Del Boca (2008). This section 
is based on Manacorda and Moretti (2005) childrenʑs housing arrangement model.24 
3.3.1 Assumptions  
For simplicity, consider a single surviving parent who has only one child. First, 
assume that parent derive some utility from cohabiting with their son while the son 
value their independence. Second, parent can transfer money to their sons in order 
to provide an incentive for them to stay at home, also, we assume that parent are 
selfish and possess all the bargaining power, so the parent appropriate the whole 
surplus if they get their children to cooperate. Third, the parent offers an income 
transfer to his child but only if he decides to live in a home; in other words, parents 
are not altruistic if the child decides to leave home.  
Finally, we assume a Stone–Geary utility function, this function offers a convincing 
argument that the consumerʑs optimal behavior for allocation of his budged takes 
places only after he secures the minimum necessary amount of each good (Chung, 
1994 p. 29). Hence, the system is characterized by the marginal budget–share and 
subsistence level parameters.25 
  
                                    
24 The motivation of the model is not specifying a structural equation to be estimated, the 
submission is to illustrate the implication of different assumptions to contextualize the 
results. 
25 The expenditure system conforms to certain conditions. The first condition is additivity 
separable function of the form U(x1,x2,…,xn) and can be represented, after a monotonic 
transformation, as the sum of a set of partial utilities functions, hence, the sum of 
expenditures or individual goods must equal the total expenditure. The second condition is 
homogeneity in prices and total expenditure: the sum of income and price elasticities 
equals zero (Chung, 1994 p. 28). The third condition is regularity, which implies quasi 
concavity of the utility function Chang and Fawson (1994). 
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3.3.2 Children utility function   
We assume that childrenʑs utility is a function of consumption (Cc) and (ac) term 
representing the disutility of living at home (with 0 < ac <1). The childʑs problem 
can be written as:   
Maximize   Uc(Cc,H) = log (Cc) + H log (ac)   (1) 
subject to  
Yc + b1H = Cc + R(1–H)    (2) 
Equation (2) represents the children budget constraint. Their resources are a 
function of their income (Yc), and the compensation they receive from their parents 
if living at home (b1). In the right hand side of the equation, the first term (Cc) is 
the child consumption and (R) their housing cost they will have to pay if living on 
their own, it can be observe if H=0. In other words, we assume that housing cost is 
borne by children if they live away from home and by parents if children cohabit.  
3.3.3 Parentʑs utility function   
The parentʑs problem can be written as:   
Maximize   Up(Cp,H) = log (Cp) + H log (ap)   (3) 
subject to  
Yp = Cp + b1H    (4) 
In equation (3), parentʑs maximize consumption (Cp), and (ap) represents the 
happiness of cohabitation with their son (with ap  1), The coefficient (H) describe 
the parent and child preference for shared living, 0,1, hence, H=1 if the child is 
living at home, H=0 otherwise. Equation (4), the fatherʑs has an amount (Yp) of 
income to spend in consumption (Cp) and any transfer to their child (H), the 
parameter (b1)(0,1) is the transfer to cohabiting children. 
Hence, fatherʑs and childrenʑs consumption can be expressed as:  
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3.3.4 Equilibrium    
In equilibrium, parents set )( 1
b  to make children indifferent between living with 
them or living on their own: 
Uc(Yc + b1, 1) = Uc(Yc – R, 0)    (7) 
Replacing childrenʑs utility function and solving by )( 1b , the optimal transfer is: 
  -
)(
 1 c
c
c Y
a
RY
b
      (8) 
Conditional on )( 1
b , parents are willing to bride their children into staying at 
home if the utility they derive from cohabitation is higher than the utility from 
living on their own.  
 )0,()1, ( 1 pppp YUbYU       (9) 
Replacing fatherʑs utility function and solving by Yp, we have.  
  
)1(
 1

 ba
a
Y
p
p
p      (10) 
Replacing equation (9) on (10). 
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In equilibrium:   
P(H=1)=Pr(Yp  A1Yc – A2R)    (12) 
The model predicts that if cohabitation is a good for parents and bad for children. 
From equation (12) in equilibrium the propensity of children to live with their 
parents depends directly on parentʑs income (Yp) and inversely on their income 
(Yc) and any housing cost they will have to pay if living on their own (R).  
Conditional to childrenʑs income and outside housing cost, an increase on parentʑs 
income is associated with a rise in cohabitation rates (Manacorda and Moretti 
2005, p. 806) 
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3.4 Data and descriptive statistics   
3.4.1 Data sources 
The dataset used comes from 2011 EMOVI (Social Mobility Survey in Mexico, 
EMOVI for its acronym in Spanish). 2011 EMOVI contains nationally 
representative samples over a long two generations. It collects a wide range of the 
data for individuals aged 25 to 64 years. Different to previous surveys in Mexico, 
2011 EMOVI is a retrospective data that allows us to connect current respondentʑs 
information and their comparable retrospective data from parentʑs and family 
conditions when the intervieweeʑs was 14 years old. This allows us to recover data 
for cohabiting and non-cohabiting children. 
We determine whether they ʔco resideʕ or live ʔindependentlyʕ based on whether 
they consider any of the adults in their household a parental figure, and on whether 
they consider themselves to be living independently or not. Although 2011 EMOVI 
data is well suited to this research, there are also some limitations. First, there is 
no retrospective information about the individuals who left the parental home prior 
to the first wave; and we do not know at what time they left, so we cannot 
associate time variables of these individuals and the interviewee. Second, other 
important variable is the birth order of the sons, there is substantial literature 
showing that birth order is a relevant precondition of social mobility; however, this 
variable is not available. Third, information on parental income is not available; 
however, parentʑs education and household conditions are a good proxy for 
permanent income.  
The analysis is limited to millenniaʑs generation cohort (1980–1999). In total, there 
are 5,192 individuals aged 25–35 years in the sample. Other conveniences in this 
sample are the follow: More old individuals stay in home to care of their parents in 
old age Reher (1998), and children less than 25 years live with parents in 
successfully completing their education and entering the labor market.  
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3.4.2 Descriptive statistics  
An overview of residence between sons and parentʑs is explored in Table 1. As can 
be seen, the majority of sons lived with both parents at the age of 14 years, about 
86 percent, in second place; about 11 percent lived with his mother. Regarding the 
first group, we note that 49 percent still share a home with their parents, 37 
percent with both parents, 4 percent with father, and 8 percent with mother. 
About 51 percent of respondents no longer live with their parents. 
Table 1. Sons currently living with their parentʑs   
Co–residence in the 
original household 
Sons currently living with their parentʑs 
Total With both 
parent's 
With  
fatherʑs 
With  
motherʑs 
Don't co 
reside 
With both parent's 1,679 172 337 2,294 4,482 
 
(37%) (4%) (8%) (51%) (100%) 
With fatherʑs 6 53 1 48 108 
 
(6%) (49%) (1%) (44%) (100%) 
With motherʑs 14 10 290 288 602 
 
(2%) (2%) (48%) (48%) (100%) 
Total 1,699 235 628 2,630 5,192 
  (33%) (5%) (12%) (51%) (100%) 
Note: Only includes children living with both parents at the age of 14 years. 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI 
Table A1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample. Around 33 percent of them 
currently live with both parents and 49 percent currently live with some parentʑs. 
Fourth percent of the sample are female, average age is around 28 years, and 
educational attainment is around 9.90 years of completed schooling, 28 percent are 
married and around 49 percent have sons. In relation to the siblings, 32 percent are 
currently living at home and around 59 of them live away from home. 
In the case of parentʑs characteristics, fatherʑs and motherʑs age are about 55.9 and 
53.18 years, and educational attainment is about 5.10 and 5.13 completed years 
schooling, respectively. Household size is also shown, average household includes 
about 5.1 members, and 51 percent of households are overcrowded.26 
  
                                    
26 The most common measure of overcrowding is persons per room. We define 
overcrowding household if currently live 2.5 or more habitants per bedroom. 
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Graph 1 illustrates co residence with parents for both sexes by age. It is observed 
a higher percentage of men living with their parents for all ages. This relationship 
is inversely correlated with age, especially for sons between 25 and 33 years old. 
However, this trend changed after 34 years, this advice than older individuals stay 
in home to care of their parents in old age, as suggest Reher (1998).   
Graph 1. Co residence with parentʑs by age   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI 
Table 2 summarizes group averages and provides the p-values of a hypothesis test, 
testing against the null hypothesis that the two groups have equal means of the 
particular observation. Similar rates of co residence are observed for both sexes in 
some characteristics. The average age for those living with their parents, and those 
who do not live with their parents are about 27 years and 29 years, respectively. 
We also observe significant differences in marital status; married children have less 
residing with their parents.  
An important difference between the sexes is observed in employment. While for 
women is a similar percentage in both categories. Men have higher labor 
participation; this participation is even greater for men who do not live with their 
parents. It is also observed that children with higher education attainment have 
higher rates of co residence. A possibility is that differences may be attributable 
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because parents support their children to keep studying. However, simply looking 
at differences in schooling cannot draw conclusions, but rather regression analysis is 
required to find the effect of co residence.  
In relation to the siblings, it is found that rates of co residence maintain a similar 
brotherʑs preferences behavior. In other words, having siblings in the home is 
associated with high rates of co-residence. On the other hand, as a generation 
conforms to more siblings, children tend to live away from home.  
Table 2. Co residence with parents by sex   
Variable 
Female (n=2,056) M ale (n=1,136) 
Living 
(n=662) 
Non 
living  
(n=1,394) 
M ean Diff 
Living  
(n=1,900) 
Non 
living  
(n=1,236)     
M ean Diff 
Age 27.511 29.242 -1.731*** 27.184 29.439 -2.255*** 
Married 0.094 0.459 -0.365*** 0.090 0.464 -0.374*** 
1 if has sons 0.329 0.852 -0.523*** 0.156 0.675 -0.519*** 
1 if employment 0.409 0.405 -0.005 0.614 0.807 -0.194*** 
Less than primary 0.060 0.081 -0.021* 0.051 0.075 -0.025*** 
Primary completed 0.127 0.216 -0.089*** 0.147 0.199 -0.052*** 
Secondary completed 0.702 0.647 0.055** 0.683 0.644 0.039** 
University completed 0.110 0.056 0.054*** 0.120 0.082 0.038*** 
Number of siblings 1.977 3.030 -1.053*** 1.868 2.716 -0.848*** 
1 if siblings living at home  0.387 0.838 -0.451*** 0.351 0.805 -0.454*** 
1 if siblings living away home 0.538 0.052 0.485*** 0.589 0.093 0.496*** 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI 
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3.5 M ethodology   
3.5.1 P robit model   
In our empirical analysis, we compare the utility of children living with their 
parents (U1) and non living with their parents (U0). More formally, suppose that 
the underlying latent variable ìy  reflects the propensity of the individual to live 
with their parents, and is a linear function of a vector of variables xi, with 
coefficient vector β. In this model we use currently individual data –schooling 
attainment, employment, sex, marital status–, retrospective information about 
parentsʑ characteristics, and data at regional and country level to describe the 
environment adult children face. The utilities for individual i are defined by 
,         , 11
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Where iō an unobserved individual–specific component and xi is is vectors of 
variables determining the decision to co reside with their parents. The alternative 
with maximal utility is chosen, so that 
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In this case the choice depends on the differences in the utilities iiii ōŊx  '01 UU , 
where 01 - ŊŊŊ   and iii ōōō 01  . Again, if the individual specific term iō  are 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed with symmetric density f, it 
follows that 
)(]P[]P[1]P[ ''' ŊxFŊxōŊxōy iiiiii     (15) 
Where F is the cumulative distribution of iō . Assuming that F is differentiable 
with derivative f (the standard normal density function corresponding to F), the 
marginal effect of the j th explanatory variable is given by 
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   (16) 
This shows that the marginal effect of changes in the explanatory variables 
depends on the level of these variables.   
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3.5.2 Empirical resu lts   
Table 3 and 4 reports average marginal effect of estimates of probit models for the 
probability of living with their parents. We estimate separately each of the 
equations for females (Table 3) and males (Table 4) to reflect differences by 
gender. As previously stated, the socio economic variables allow us to identify the 
parameter of interest, in particular, if the child performs economic activity, and 
educational achievements, the set of controls included are marital status and if the 
respondent has children.  
In Model 1 (Column 1) for both sexes, we estimate the impact of schooling. 
Surprisingly to the results in other papers, we do not find evidence of the effect of 
schooling of children on the propensity to co reside with their parents. This result 
is still maintained for the different specifications. Contrary as we expect, the effect 
of education attained on the propensity to remain living with parents is absent.   
In relations to employment rate, we found that working reduce the propensity to co 
residence with parents only for male sample, this is explained in part by labor 
participation –female employment rate is only 40% as opposed to 80% for males– 
for children not living with their parents. This results is similar to previous papers 
that suggest womenʑs labor force participation, more than menʑs, is affected by 
family composition. (Connelly, et al., p. 2). In addition, research on womenʑs labor 
force participation has often found that the need to care for children reduces  
womenʑs labor market employment. However, these coefficients should be 
considered with caution due to the possible endogeneity between labor 
participation and co residence. There could be unobservable factors related to 
stronger preferences for working as opposed to co residence with parents. On the 
contrary, it could be also that components of the error term reflect high 
propensities to work inducing a positive correlation (Crespo, 2008 p. 12).27 
                                    
27 Hence, resulting marginal effect of the co residence variable can be interpreted as the 
exogenous portion of the effect, while the marginal effect of the residual can be interpreted 
as a measure of the relationship of the unobserved characteristics correlated with the 
choice to co residence and participation in the labor markets (Connelly, 2014 p. 14). IV 
procedure could be the follow: the first stage is a reduced form co residence equation, while 
the second stage is a labor force participation equation, which includes both co residence 
with adult children and the residuals of the co residence equation as independent variable.  
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Also, we found that age is significant in most equations, as we expect we found a 
positive relationship between the leaving parentʑs household and aging of the 
children, these results are largely consistent with Flatau et al., (2003) who also find 
a gradual rise in the age at which those under the age of 30 are leaving home. The 
positive sign of the quadratic term suggests that for the final years as the 
generational court, children have to observe inferior rates of co residence with their 
parents. In Graph A1 we report the predicted probabilities to living parentʑs 
house by age.  
The other variable of interest is the effect of co residing observed in siblings. In 
column (2) dummies variables are included to capture this dimension. In this case, 
the coefficients suggest that having brothers away from home and living at home is 
associated with households where the brothers have similar preferences of co 
residence. However, since in the database is not possible to determine the birth 
order, we cannot associate preferences to leave the parental home between older 
siblings to younger siblings or vice versa.   
In columns (3), (4) and (5) controls for parentʑs education and occupation are 
added (proxies for permanent income). In households where mothers have a higher 
education it is less likely that adult children co reside. This interpretation here is 
twofold: in higher educated households potentially greater resources are available to 
the household which allow children to move out earlier. In relation to fatherʑs 
schooling, the effect is not significant.  
Hence, the working status of parents, especially the motherʑs one, appears to be the 
most important factor, robust coefficients show a positive relationship in the 
departure of the children home. There might be several explanations supporting 
this view. On one hand a working mother reduces the amount of goods and services 
produced in the household, rendering less appealing living with parents; on the 
other, her status increases the household income, providing a better insurance to all 
members. In this respect, the coefficient can also be interpreted as a proxy for 
family culture of womenʑs independence which coherently is greater for woman 
than for man.  
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In addition, motherʑs working status can also be interpreted as a proxy for family 
attitude towards women independence Chiuri and Del Boca (2008). Similary, Diaz 
and Guillo (2005) found that children living in household where both parents are 
working may experience low unemployment rates, which is associated with 
independence of children at a younger age. 28  
Finally, some of the contextual variables do affect individual co residential rates, 
such as, home owners, housing cost and overcrowded home, these variables do not 
have effect. 
  
                                    
28 In McElroy (1985) theoretical model the reservation wage of young adults who live with 
their parents, and their utility as a member of their parentʑs household, decrease with their 
motherʑs wage. Therefore, as their motherʑs wages increase, their probability of moving out 
increases as well 
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Table 3. Average marginal effect for female sample   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 if employment -0.0227 -0.00366 -0.00382 -0.00482 -0.00508 
 (-0.947) (-0.142) (-0.148) (-0.186) (-0.197) 
Years of schooling 0.00767* 0.00707 0.00514 0.00124 0.00117 
 (2.210) (1.900) (1.306) (0.308) (0.288) 
Age -0.237** -0.191* -0.184* -0.213** -0.208** 
 (-3.233) (-2.446) (-2.360) (-2.724) (-2.655) 
Age square 0.00385** 0.00304* 0.00294* 0.00344** 0.00335* 
 (3.090) (2.300) (2.220) (2.591) (2.524) 
1 if married -0.272*** -0.211*** -0.208*** -0.215*** -0.212*** 
 (-9.790) (-7.101) (-7.043) (-7.219) (-7.120) 
1 if have children -0.328*** -0.200*** -0.192*** -0.195*** -0.193*** 
 (-8.897) (-5.091) (-4.905) (-4.970) (-4.913) 
Number of children -0.0358* -0.0200 -0.0190 -0.0210 -0.0212 
 (-2.278) (-1.224) (-1.166) (-1.286) (-1.299) 
1 if has siblings living in home  0.436*** 0.435*** 0.429*** 0.426*** 
  (10.588) (10.578) (10.420) (10.376) 
1 if has siblings living away home  -0.143** -0.155** -0.157** -0.162** 
  (-2.666) (-2.872) (-2.903) (-3.016) 
1 if father used to work   0.00221  0.0293 
   (0.070)  (0.896) 
Father's years of schooling   0.00383  -0.00303 
   (1.221)  (-0.759) 
1 if mother used to work    0.0947*** 0.0970** 
    (3.312) (3.265) 
Mother's years of schooling    0.0115*** 0.0134** 
    (3.360) (3.068) 
Number of siblings  YES YES YES YES YES 
Fatherʑs with some disabilities YES YES YES YES YES 
Fatherʑs indigenous condition  YES YES YES YES YES 
Household socioeconomic index YES YES YES YES YES 
1 if they were home owners YES YES YES YES YES 
1 if overcrowded home YES YES YES YES YES 
Housing cost YES YES YES YES YES 
Dummies: locality size, state YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,056 2,056 2,049 2,048 2,042 
Log lik. -904.9 -761.4 -754.3 -738.1 -732.7 
McFadden's R2 0.300 0.411 0.413 0.425 0.426 
Count R 81.96% 85.56% 85.60% 85.60% 85.80% 
Notes. Marginal effects, parentheses contain the mean of the estimated standard errors. 
*: p < 0.10, **: <0.05, ***: p<0.01 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI  
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Table 4. Average marginal effect for male sample   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 if employment  -0.109*** -0.0847*** -0.0827*** -0.0828*** -0.0818** 
 (-4.650) (-3.452) (-3.340) (-3.346) (-3.278) 
Years of schooling 0.00568 0.00528 0.00375 0.00253 0.00251 
 (1.942) (1.749) (1.148) (0.777) (0.754) 
Age -0.230*** -0.221** -0.223** -0.222** -0.223** 
 (-3.390) (-3.147) (-3.164) (-3.137) (-3.148) 
Age square 0.00343** 0.00337** 0.00341** 0.00338** 0.00341** 
 (2.968) (2.819) (2.842) (2.819) (2.832) 
1 if married -0.281*** -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.209*** -0.206*** 
 (-10.708) (-7.613) (-7.552) (-7.679) (-7.529) 
1 if have children -0.286*** -0.153*** -0.159*** -0.150*** -0.155*** 
 (-7.722) (-3.944) (-4.076) (-3.844) (-3.946) 
Number of children -0.0640*** -0.0567** -0.0564** -0.0566** -0.0567** 
 (-3.489) (-2.975) (-2.941) (-2.958) (-2.950) 
1 if has siblings living in home  0.408*** 0.408*** 0.406*** 0.408*** 
  (11.908) (11.831) (11.812) (11.794) 
1 if has siblings living away home  -0.129** -0.131** -0.130** -0.133** 
  (-3.112) (-3.138) (-3.123) (-3.186) 
1 if father used to work   0.0283  0.0374 
   (0.949)  (1.220) 
Father's years of schooling   0.00321  -0.00234 
   (1.170)  (-0.662) 
1 if mother used to work     -0.00584** 0.00182** 
    (-0.212) (0.064) 
Mother's years of schooling    0.00781** 0.00972* 
    (2.644) (2.538) 
Number of siblings  YES YES YES YES YES 
Fatherʑs with some disabilities YES YES YES YES YES 
Fatherʑs indigenous condition  YES YES YES YES YES 
Household socioeconomic index YES YES YES YES YES 
1 if they were home owners YES YES YES YES YES 
1 if overcrowded home YES YES YES YES YES 
Housing cost YES YES YES YES YES 
Dummies: locality size, state YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,136 3,136 3,126 3,122 3,114 
Log lik. -1,466.0 -1,273.9 -1,266.8 -1,265.2 -1,258.3 
McFadden's R2 0.303 0.394 0.396 0.396 0.398 
Count R 79.34% 83.29% 83.43% 83.47% 83.46% 
Notes. Marginal effects, parentheses contain the mean of the estimated standard errors. 
*: p < 0.10, **: <0.05, ***: p<0.01 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI.  
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3.6 Conclusions   
This paper adds to the literature by examining the determinants of childrenʑs 
propensity to live with their parents. Why young adults co-residence with her 
parents beyond mature age has several issue. i.e., living with parentʑs serves as an 
important mechanism through with parents transfer resources to their adultʑs sons. 
We focus on Millenniaʑs Generation (1980–1999) in order to consider some relevant 
characteristicsʑ in this generation such as more educational outcomes than previous 
generations, however, economic achievements may have affected due to episodes of 
economic crisis–.  
Based on Manacorda and Moretti (2005) I develop a theoretical model to illustrate 
childrenʑs and parents living arrangements. Conditional to childrenʑs income and 
outside housing cost, an increase on parentʑs income is associated with a rise in 
cohabitation rates.  
Regarding the empirical results, comparing utility levels for sons living with their 
parentʑs and non living I found that labor participation reduce the propensity to co 
residence only for males, this is explained in part by lower labor participation for 
female sample, however, this results should be considered with caution due to 
endogeneity between labor participation and co residence. Surprisingly to the 
results in other papers, the effect of education attained on the propensity to remain 
living with parents is absent.  
In addition, controlling by working status and schooling of parentʑs we found that 
motherʑs appears to be the most important. There might be several explanations 
supporting this view. On one hand a working mother reduces the amount of goods 
and services produced in the household, rendering less appealing living with 
parents; on the other, her status increases the household income, providing a better 
insurance to all members. Similar to other papers, we found that children living in 
household where both parents are working may experience low unemployment 
rates, which is associated with independence of children at younger age.  
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5 Appendix    
Table A1. Descriptive statistics   
Variable M in M ax M ean SD  N  
1 if living with both parentʑs 0 1 0.33 0.47 5,192 
1 if living with some parentʑs 0 1 0.49 0.50 5,192 
1 if living only with fatherʑs 0 1 0.37 0.48 5,192 
1 if living only with motherʑs 0 1 0.45 0.50 5,192 
1 if female 0 1 0.40 0.49 5,192 
1 if employed  0 1 0.57 0.49 5,192 
Age 25 35 28.32 3.13 5,192 
Age squared 625 1,225 811.55 184.43 5,192 
Completed years schooling 0 26 9.90 3.62 5,192 
1 if married 0 1 0.28 0.45 5,192 
1 if have sons 0 1 0.49 0.50 5,192 
Number of sons 0 7 0.92 1.18 5,192 
1 if have siblings 0 1 0.82 0.38 5,192 
Number of siblings 0 14 2.40 2.22 5,192 
1 if siblings living away home 0 1 0.59 0.49 5,192 
1 if siblings living at home 0 1 0.32 0.47 5,192 
1 if father's household head 0 1 0.85 0.36 5,192 
Fatherʑs currently age 35 100 55.91 9.04 4,351 
1 if father used to work 0 1 0.82 0.38 5,192 
Fatherʑs completed years schooling 0 25 5.10 4.52 5,192 
1 if fatherʑs indigenous 0 1 0.13 0.33 5,192 
1 if fatherʑs with some disabilities 0 1 0.00 0.06 5,192 
Motherʑs currently age 31 97 53.18 8.20 4,611 
1 if mother used to work 0 1 0.21 0.41 5,192 
Motherʑs completed years schooling 0 24 5.13 4.21 5,192 
1 if motherʑs indigenous 0 1 0.12 0.33 5,192 
1 if mothers with some disabilities 0 1 0.00 0.06 5,192 
1 if they are home owners 0 1 0.64 0.48 5,192 
Number of people living in home 1 22 5.14 2.05 5,192 
1 if overcrowded housing 0 1 0.51 0.50 5,192 
Housing costs  363 6,750 1,875 912 5,192 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI 
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 Graph A1. Predicted probabilities to living with some parentʑs by sex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI 
 
Graph A2. Predicted probabilities to living with both parentʑs by sex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Only include children with both parentʑs alive. 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI 
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Graph A3. Predicted probabilities to living with parentʑs by marital status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authorʑs calculation based on 2011 EMOVI 
 
 
 
